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For more than a quarter century, the modern bankruptcy adjudication structure
has been premised upon untested assumptions about the bankruptcy power and
Article III that were rejected in, or may be subject to challenge following, the
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Stern v. Marshall. Using Marshall as a focal
point of the discussion, this article explores both the structural gap between the
design of the bankruptcy system and its constitutional limits and the causes of the
temporal gap between the adoption of the current structure and the Court's
consideration of its constitutionality. Although these constitutional gaps have
allowed the bankruptcy system to flourish during the last three decades, they have
also increased its cost and complexity unnecessarily and, after Marshall, we may
expect these effects to be far more pronounced. This article also outlines the need
to bridge these gaps as a precondition to developing an informed and
constitutionally sound bankruptcy system that can realize the promise of the
Bankruptcy Code.
CONSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
Every few years, we are reminded of both the fragility and adaptability of
American bankruptcy law. Carefully balanced rights and responsibilities or well-
established practices may be forever altered with a few strokes of the pen, either
through the seemingly endless parade of special interest driven amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code' ("Code") or Supreme Court opinions. At every turn, the initial
uproar or delight over a particular change tends to fall predictably according to how
it will weaken or strengthen a particular class of debtors or creditors rather than its
wisdom (or lack thereof) across bankruptcy cases or our political system as a whole.
And, time and again, bankruptcy courts and practitioners adapt and carry on as they
did before.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Stern v. Marshall2 in June 2011 is the latest
development in this historical trend. In Marshall, the Court limited Article I
bankruptcy courts' authority to hear certain private rights counterclaims, 3 rejected
"consent by ambush" (whereby creditors who file a proof of claim are deemed to
consent to resolution of even tangentially related disputes with the debtor in
bankruptcy court),4 and, at times, appeared to question the constitutionality of the
very framework of the current bankruptcy court structure.! The Court's rationale
suggests that modern bankruptcy will become less efficient and subject to greater
procedural mischief, notwithstanding the majority's view that its opinion is narrow
and should not result in meaningful change to the existing division of authority
among bankruptcy, district and state courts.
Regardless of one's view of the outcome in Marshall, it was hardly surprising.
Even a perfunctory review of bankruptcy case law and scholarship of the last three
decades reveals that questions concerning the constitutionality of the adjudication of
disputes under the Code predate its enactment. Less than four years after its
passage, a plurality of the Supreme Court found one of the most critical features of
the new law-authorizing Article I bankruptcy courts to adjudicate a broad range of
matters related to a bankruptcy case-unconstitutional. 6 Specifically, the plurality
reasoned that although Article I courts may be authorized to resolve public rights
matters (disputes between the government and other parties or matters closely
intertwined with a public regulatory scheme), they may not exercise Article III
judicial power over private rights matters (those concerning the "the liability of one
1 11 U.S.C. §§101-1532 (Supp. 2010) [as amended, hereinafter the Bankruptcy Code or Code].
2 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
3 Id at 2611 (holding that bankruptcy court lacked requisite Article III authority to enter final judgment on
widow's tortuous interference counterclaim, even though counterclaim was core proceeding under
Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
4 Id (finding debtor's claim was state law action independent of federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily
resolv able by ruling on creditor's proof of claim in bankruptcy).
See id. at 2620 (stating that current bankruptcy system, which allows bankruptcy courts to enter final
judgment on state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on creditor's proof of claim,
violates Article III of Constitution and therefore is threat to separation of powers).
6N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982).
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individual to another" under applicable law).7 Following "a process that reflects no
credit on any branch of the federal government,"8 the 1984 Amendments to the
Code ostensibly addressed the constitutional problem by, among other things,
conferring bankruptcy jurisdiction on the district courts and authorizing them to
refer cases and proceedings within that jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges, who are
now appointed by the applicable circuit courts. 9
The 1984 Amendments to the bankruptcy court system, aided by doubts about
the staying power of the Northern Pipeline v. Marathon'o plurality and the more
relaxed approach to similar questions in some subsequent Supreme Court decisions,
provided sufficient comfort about the viability of the modern system to allow much
of the promise of the Code's design to be realized in spite of its uncertain
constitutionality. During that time, more than 29 million bankruptcy cases were
filed, with the overwhelming majority long since closed." The $2 billion in
projected liabilities of Johns Manville,12 the largest bankruptcy in American history
as of 1982,13 now appears quaint compared to the mega-bankruptcies of the last
decade. The current system may not be a model of efficiency, but it has proven
remarkably resilient and adaptable to the needs of debtors and creditors alike. And
at least some of the inefficiencies may be more the result of political maneuvering
and Congress' incessant tinkering with its provisions at the behest of powerful
special interests than inherent flaws in the Code's original design.
In reaffirming the Marathon plurality's public/private analysis and rejecting the
assertion that the 1984 Amendments resolved the Article III problem, Marshall may
be best viewed as an opportunity to revisit past debates, prejudices and
misperceptions. The calls for procedural reform from two bankruptcy
commissions,14 a long-range planning committee,' 5 and distinguished individual
7 Id. at 71-72 (distinguishing restructuring of debtor-creditor relation as public right that Article I courts
may be authorized to resolve, from right to recover contract damages as private right that Article I courts
may not resolve).
Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the Judicial
Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARv. J. LEGIS. 1, 1 (1985).
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) ("[D]istrict court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or
all proceedings arising under title 11 . . . shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district."); 28
U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006) ("[D]istrict courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under
title 11.").
10 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
1 See Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year (1980-2009), Am. BANKR. INST.,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&
CONTENTID=63164 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (displaying table of bankruptcy filings during relevant time
period).
12 Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
13 See S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos Bankruptcy
Paradox, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 841, 846 (2008).
14 See NAT'L BANKR. REv. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 718 (1997)
(recommending transition to establish bankruptcy court under Article III) [hereinafter 1997 NBRC Report].
See also COMM'N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., HR. DOC. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 92 (1st Sess. 1973)
(discussing judicial and administrative functions in bankruptcy and potential for expanding diversityjurisdiction) [hereinafter 1973 NBRC Report].
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commentators16 during the last 27 years fell on deaf ears. The convenient delusion
that the simplicity and efficiency envisioned in 1978 can be realized without
fundamental adjustments to the bankruptcy court framework may have been
understandable before Marshall, but even the most desirable delusions must
eventually yield to reality. And the reality after Marshall is clear: we must either
accept further well-defined restrictions on the sweeping jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts that track the public/private dichotomy or reconstitute bankruptcy courts
under Article III.
To better appreciate these competing options, Part I begins by framing the
historical developments and expectations that (however slowly) paved the path to
Marshall. Although literally dozens of articles have outlined portions of this
history over the years, this section demonstrates that Marshall is less a return to an
outmoded mechanism for evaluating Article I adjudication than a reaffirmation of
the unique constitutional concerns that arise due to the sweeping judicial power
granted to modern bankruptcy courts.
While Part I may be read as a survey of where we have been and why, Part II
envisions the future of bankruptcy practice without any legislative or administrative
modifications to the current system. Although the Marshall majority limited its
holding to the question of whether bankruptcy courts may exercise jurisdiction over
"a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's
proof of claim,"' 7 its rationale suggests that bankruptcy courts lack authority to
adjudicate numerous other matters they have heard and decided previously. In the
immediate future, the resulting uncertainty may fuel greater litigation, as unsatisfied
litigants attempt to overturn unfavorable rulings or use the resulting delays to exact
otherwise undue concessions. Over time, Marshall's ambiguous standard appears
likely to generate conflicting modifications to controlling law, procedure and
practice across circuits and among districts within circuits. This potential may be
best characterized by the late Vern Countryman's criticism of the 1984
Amendments: "a hitherto unacceptable situation has now been rendered
intolerable."' 8
Part III evaluates the potential for creating Article III bankruptcy courts and
contrasts it with the only other viable alternative: uniform modifications to the
delegation of authority among bankruptcy and district courts. This section
15 See JuD. CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FED. COURTS 52 (Dec. 1995) (suggesting
each district court continue to include bankruptcy court consisting of fixed-term judges having bankruptcy
experience).
16 See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 Am. BANKR.
L.J. 529, 541-52 (1998) (asserting issues of delay and uncertainty in law in a non-Article III bankruptcy
court system); Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984,
38 VAND. L. REv. 675, 710 (1985) (arguing that 1984 amendments are potentially invalid due to Congress'
refusal to constitute bankruptcy courts as Article III courts); see also Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial
Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REv. 747, 753 n.13 (2010) (surveying
scholarship questioning constitutionality of bankruptcy court structure under Code).
17 Stemnv. Marshall, 131 5. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
18 Countryman, supra note 8, at 1.
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demonstrates that many of the policy concerns that derailed efforts to create Article
III bankruptcy courts in 1978 and 1984 are no longer valid, but it also suggests that
doing so may not be politically desirable or avoid fundamental constitutional
questions concerning the reach of the Code. In the absence of structural reform of
the bankruptcy courts, this section encourages a narrow reading of Marshall,
consistent with the majority's characterization of its opinion, to promote review of
the public/private dichotomy questions that, until answered, may continue to plague
bankruptcy practice.
I. BANKRUPTCY COURTS PAST AND PRESENT
The bankruptcy process is a constitutional enigma. It may be fairly said that no
other enumerated power, as understood at the time of the Convention and in each of
the laws passed in the exercise of this power, incorporates individual matters of
private right so completely as the bankruptcy power.19 At the same time, the
Bankruptcy Code contemplates that courts lacking the protections of Article III will
nonetheless exercise the judicial power of the United States and adjudicate many of
these private right matters. 20 This conflict came to a head in Marathon and, after
nearly three decades, again in Marshall. This section discusses the history of
bankruptcy adjudication, how this process evolved to give rise to the conflict, the
efforts to resolve it following Marathon, and the Court's ultimate rejection of these
efforts in Marshall.
A. Early Conceptions of Bankruptcy Administration
Although there is little historical record concerning the debate over the
Bankruptcy Clause at the Convention,21 and the Federalist Papers suggest its
addition was an obvious necessity,22 Anti-Federalists viewed the clause with
suspicion. For example, in one passage, the Federal Farmer 23 backed away from
apparently conceding the need for the clause in an earlier letter, noting:
19 See McKenzie, supra note 16, at 751 (discussing historical practice before and after the Convention).
20 See id. (noting bankruptcy judges confront matters sounding in almost every area of civil law, including
contract, tort, property, and labor matters).
21 See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMVIENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1100, at
4 (1st ed. 1833) ("The power to pass laws on the subject of bankruptcies was not in the original draft of the
constitution [sic]. . . . The brevity, with which this subject is treated by the Federalist, is quite remarkable.").
22 Federalist No. 42 provides little more than a conclusory argument in favor of its inclusion:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with
the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not
likely to be drawn into question.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 95 (James Madison) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009).
23 Although the Federal Farmer was widely considered the pseudonym for Richard Henry Lee for nearly
two centuries, this attribution has been drawn into question. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, Note, The
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By giving this [bankruptcy] power to the union, we greatly extend
the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, as all questions arising on
bankrupt laws, being laws of the union, even between citizens of
the same state, may be tried in the federal courts; and I think it may
be shewn, that by the help of these laws, actions between citizens of
different states, and the laws of the federal city, aided by no
overstrained judicial fictions, almost all civil causes may be drawn
into those courts.24
These fears have been revisited in debates over bankruptcy policy over time and
continue to inform the modern debate over the reach of bankruptcy law. 2 5
Notwithstanding these concerns, experience with colonial-era bankruptcy
systems suggested that "preserving harmony, promoting justice, and securing
equality of rights and remedies among the citizens of all the states" required federal
authority over bankruptcy matters.2 6 As Justice Story explained:
It is obvious, that if the [bankruptcy] power is exclusively vested in
the states, each one will be at liberty to frame such a system of
legislation upon the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency, as best
suits its own local interests, and pursuits . . . . What is here stated is
not purely speculative. It has occurred among the American states
in the most offensive forms, without any apparent reluctance or
compunction on the part of the offending state. There will always
be found in every state a large mass of politicians, who will deem it
more safe to consult their own temporary interests and popularity,
by a narrow system of preferences, than to enlarge the boundaries,
so as to give to distant creditors a fair share of the fortune of a
ruined debtor. There can be no other adequate remedy than giving a
power to the general government to introduce and perpetuate a
uniform system.2 1
Authorship of the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 299, 299 (1974). To that end, this
article simply refers to the author as "the Federal Farmer."
24 FEDERAL FARMER, LETTER XVIII (Jan. 25, 1788), reprinted in RICHARD HENRY LEE, AN ADDITIONAL
NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 173 (Quadrangle Books 1962).
25 See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227,
241 (2000) ("By deferring to nonbankruptcy substantive law, bankruptcy preserves both the vertical and
horizontal separation of powers that currently characterizes such law, and promotes the jurisdictional
competition that flows from the horizontal separation of sovereigns. Bankruptcy, then, can be viewed as
federalist to the extent that its rules are merely procedural and directed at solving the problem of the
common pool.").
26 See STORY, supra note 21, at 54 (suggesting federal bankruptcy power is necessary to prevent private
oppression).
27 See id. at 54-55.
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Practical necessity aside, the self-limiting nature of historical bankruptcy
practice suggested that it was a poor vehicle for extensive federal intrusion into
state power or individual liberty.28 These systems were limited to bankrupt
merchants29 and served primarily to allocate assets among their respective
creditors. 30 Although they varied in their specific operation, an agent (usually
selected by creditors) was charged with marshaling and ultimately liquidating the
bankrupt's assets, including recovery of the bankrupt's property held by others and
the pursuit of legal claims against others in the appropriate court. 31 The court sitting
in bankruptcy adjudicated disputes concerning distribution to creditors and the
debtor's eligibility for relief under the bankruptcy law, including the discharge of
debts and release from debtors' prison.32 Legal and equitable rights established
under non-bankruptcy law were largely incorporated in the bankruptcy distribution
scheme, albeit modified to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of
bankruptcy law.33 In sum, in light of the fact that bankruptcy laws had to be invoked
by individual creditors of the bankrupt and the historical limits of bankruptcy
practice generally, the specter of federal usurpation of almost all civil disputes may
have been readily dismissed as the paranoid ruminations of an uninformed Anti-
Federalist.
The first federal bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,34 followed this
basic framework. Although the law authorized the creditor-appointed administrator
to pursue civil litigation to marshal the bankrupt's assets, the act contemplated that
litigation to enforce a bankrupt's rights against its own debtors would take place in
other courts rather than the federal court sitting in bankruptcy. 35 Similarly, certain
claims against the bankrupt that were unliquidated as of the commencement of the
28 See Frederick R. Corbit, The Founding Fathers' Influence on Bankruptcy Law, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
July/Aug. 2007 at 50, 51 (2007) ("Records of a detailed discussion of what our Founding Fathers understood
to be laws with respect to bankruptcy would probably have shown that they had a more narrow view of
bankruptcy law than we have today.").
29 See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES pt. 1, app. at 260 (Philadelphia, William
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) ("Whilst the bankrupt laws are confined to [merchants], and are
resorted to, merely as a necessary regulation of commerce, their effect, in preventing frauds, especially
where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different states, will probably be so salutary,
that the expediency of this branch of the powers of congress, will cease to be drawn in question.").
30 See id. at 259 (explaining debtors must be deprived of all assets to pay off creditors).
31 See Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 567, 600 (1998) (analyzing English and early American bankruptcy laws).
32 See Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz's New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign Immunity: The
Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 95, 114-16 (2007) (detailing
historical federal law which allowed bankruptcy courts to order discharge from debtors' prison and liability
for debts).
33 See Plank, supra note 31, at 600-10 (outlining various provisions of early American bankruptcy laws).
34 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (amended 1801, 1802 and repealed 1803) [as amended,
hereinafter 1800 Act]. As noted below, the bankruptcy laws of 1841, Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat.
440 (1841) (repealed 1843), and 1867, Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (repealed
1878), followed similar frameworks.
35 See, e.g., Plank, supra note 31, at 613 ("Under the early bankruptcy legislation, the assignees of the
bankrupt's property sued in a court of record-the common law courts or the equity courts-to enforce
contractual claims against third parties or to recover property that the bankrupt conveyed to third parties.").
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case were omitted from any distribution, though they could be brought and pursued
following the close of the case.36 This status was determined by reference to private
rights under non-bankruptcy law, but the adjudication of rights with respect to pure
tort issues did not occur in the bankruptcy forum.37 Ultimately, the line between
final adjudication of rights arising under non-bankruptcy law and consideration of
these rights in a manner that might ultimately settle them for all practical purposes
in bankruptcy was hazy but nonetheless respected before, during and long after the
colonial period.
In sum, the relative dearth of debate concerning the reach of the Bankruptcy
Clause appears to be the product of its historical attributes as of the Convention and
the need for uniformity in application, not a general consensus that bankruptcy
policy somehow trumped the separation and balance of powers issues that defined
much of the debate over the Constitution. At best, we can draw assumptions about
the limits of legislative and judicial authority in the bankruptcy context from the
historical record, but even the historical record can betray us in light of the complex
range of political and social forces at work at the time of the Convention, the
distinction between the laws and powers exercised by authorities of a single
sovereign unrestrained by the specific devices of the Constitution, and the
occasional implementation of likely unconstitutional laws to achieve desired results
in the time between passage and invalidation. 38
In those instances where Congress exercised the bankruptcy power, as
understood then and throughout much of our nation's history, the law largely
36 See In re Schuchardt, 21 F. Cas. 739, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1876) (holding unliquidated tort claim not provable
in bankruptcy). Subsequent federal bankruptcy law likewise followed this same approach. See COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, 543, at 362-63 (Matthew Bender & Co., 4th ed. 1937) (noting that under Act of 1898, like
its predecessors, "liabilities for torts were not discharged unless in judgment, and then only when . . . based
on a claim not within the exceptions of the statute"). For example, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, only
debts that were due and payable as of adjudication of the case were compensable and dischargeable.
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 19, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 525 (repealed 1878) (listing limited categories of claims
subject to administration); see also In re Boston & Fairhaven Iron Works, 23 F. 880, 881 (C.C.D. Mass.
1885) ("A claim for damages for a tort is not a claim provable in bankruptcy, unless liquidated or reduced to
judgment prior to the date of proceedings in bankruptcy."); Zimmer v. Schleehauf, 115 Mass. 52, 53 (1874)
(holding unliquidated slander and malicious prosecution claims excluded from bankruptcy court). All other
claims survived the bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act of 1867, § 21, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 526-27 (repealed 1878)
(discharging only provable claims).
37 See In re Schuchardt, 21 F. Cas. at 742 (holding tort claims not claims provable in bankruptcy).
For example, section 63(a)(1) of the 1898 Act initially limited provable debts to those "evidenced by a
judgment ... absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 63(a)(1),
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562-63 (superseded 1978). Although this changed slightly during the Act's eighty-year
history, claims that were not reduced to judgment before or during the pendency of the case still remained
excluded from the bankruptcy case and were not dischargeable. See Stephen Allen Edwards, Tort Claims
Under the Present and Proposed Bankruptcy Acts, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 420-22 (1978)
(discussing effects of bankruptcy on tort creditors' nonprovable claims).
38 See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 19 (Hary. Univ. Press 1935)
(discussing historical pattern of passing likely unconstitutional debt relief laws that largely achieve their
purpose in the temporal gap between passage and Supreme Court holdings finding them unconstitutional).
Although these tended to be state laws that arose long after the Convention, they are raised here merely to
demonstrate that constitutional questions may take a back seat to the need to resolve an immediate crisis.
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followed the historical administrative approach and, within that framework, the
power was consistently recognized as complete. 3 9 The debates of the Nineteenth
and early Twentieth Centuries-its gradual expansion beyond merchants and the
inclusion of supervised debtor restructuring provisions-sparked discussion over
the nature of the bankruptcy power and its reach, 4 0 but only with respect to the
narrow issues at hand.
Whatever its reach,41 the bankruptcy power was rarely exercised, and then only
as short-term responses to immediate financial crises, prior to the passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898.42 The first federal bankruptcy law plodded through
Congress for more than a decade before a financial crash driven by rampant real
estate speculation forced the government's hand.43 The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was
passed as a temporary measure (it expressly expired after five years) and was
rescinded after just three years.44 Efforts to pass a subsequent bankruptcy law
between 1822 and 1827 failed, 45 and the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was effective
slightly more than a year before it was rescinded.4 6 The Bankruptcy Act of 1867
was the first federal bankruptcy law to remain on the books longer than three years,
but it was the subject of frequent calls for rescission and amendment throughout its
short history.4 7
By the time the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was passed, the law applied to
merchants and non-merchants and included provisions for liquidation and
compositions, as well as voluntary and involuntary petitions. 48 As with the 1867
39 See Thomas E. Plank, State Sovereignty in Bankruptcy After Katz, 15 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 59, 64-
65 (2007) (noting bankruptcy power did not modify non-bankruptcy rights of creditors and debtors).
40 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 27
(Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (comparing early interpretations of meaning of term "bankruptcy" as used in
Constitution).
41 As one author noted, "the outer limits of Congress's Bankruptcy Power are not well defined." Brubaker,
supra note 32, at 133.
42 See SKEEL, JR., supra note 40, at 24-25 (explaining history of bankruptcy law from 1800 to 1898).
43See id. at 25 (stating depression in 1793 precipitated first federal bankruptcy law); see also G. Eric
Brunstad, Jr., Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A Theory on the Unique Role of
Bankruptcy Law, 55 BUS. LAW. 499, 500 n.4 (2000) (explaining that Act of 1800 was enacted partly in
response to various failed land speculations).
44 See WARREN, supra note 38, at 19. As Warren explained:
The dissatisfaction with the law had been very general-based on several grounds. First
there was the difficulty of travel to the distant and unpopular Federal Courts. Second,
very small dividends had been paid to creditors, as most of the debtors petitioned into
bankruptcy were already in jail. Third, the Act had been largely used by rich debtors
and speculators, and in some cases by fraudulent debtors, to obtain discharge from their
debts and start their operations afresh.
Id. at 19-20.
45 Id. at 28-45 (detailing history of proposed legislation between 1822 and 1827).
46 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2016, 2018 (2003) (stating 1841 Act lasted only two years).
47 See WARREN, supra note 38, at 109-18 (presenting criticisms of 1867 Act).
48 Bakrptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 544-47, 549 (repealed 1979).
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Act, the 1898 Act was fashioned as a permanent law,4 9 faced almost immediate
efforts to repeal it, and was amended early and often.so Unlike the 1867 Act,
however, the 1898 Act survived eight decades and began a period of more than 113
years (and counting) of uninterrupted federal bankruptcy law.
B. Referees Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Although the Federalists and Anti-federalists may have had different views
concerning the bankruptcy power, they clearly assumed that the judiciary would
oversee bankruptcy disputes due to the nature of the matters considered. This view
has only rarely been challenged. As Remington explained in 1950:
By its very nature, the administration of insolvency cases is a
judicial function, once the requisite legislation is set up, or at least a
matter for judicial supervision. Adequate handling of such matters
requires the determination of a series of points of law in the light of
facts presented even in the simplest instance and frequently runs
into numerous incidental and collateral controversies of a
justiciable nature, the conclusive determination of which is
essential to complete and ultimate disposition.5 '
The 1898 Act continued this presumption by conferring jurisdiction in bankruptcy
on existing federal district courts, the supreme court of the District of Columbia and
the federal territorial courts.52 When sitting in bankruptcy, these courts were
considered "separate and distinct courts, and exercise[d] powers and jurisdiction
separate and distinct from their powers and jurisdiction as originally constituted, to
the same extent as if they were separate and distinct tribunals."5 3
Courts sitting in bankruptcy were authorized to appoint "referees,"5 4 to whom
they could refer bankruptcy cases. Although referees filled a quasi-judicial role,
their authority to adjudicate disputes was limited both by statute and the order
referring cases to them.5 Initially, this reference was not automatic, referee orders
were not final in the modern sense, and review of referee decisions was taken by
49 See Leslie R. Masterston, Waiving the Right to a Jury: Claims, Counterclaims, and Informal Claims, 85
Am. BANKR. L.J. 91, 92 (2011).
50 See WARREN, supra note 38, at 143.
51 HAROLD REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 13, at 27 (5th
ed. 1950).
52 Bankruptcy Act 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 545 (repealed 1978) (specifying courts with jurisdiction).
53 FRANK 0. LOVELAND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PROCEEDINGS IN BANKRUPTCY § 14 (3d ed.
1907).
54 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §34, 30 Stat. 544, 555 (repealed 1979) (granting bankruptcy courts
discretion to appoint referees to two year terms).
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 36, 845 at 619 ("The referee is an officer of the court of
bankruptcy, deriving his powers from the order of reference-reading this, of course, in light of the
Bankruptcy Act.").
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"petition for review" rather than appeal.56 Their limited quasi-judicial roles involved
"matters relating to property over which they had direct control, matters referred to
them as special masters by judges, and matters submitted by consent of the
parties."5 7 Jurisdiction "of all controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished
from proceedings in bankruptcy," remained in the courts in which they would have
been decided outside of bankruptcy.58 In short, referees "originally were required to
perform purely ministerial functions; their judicial role was minor."
The referees' adjudicative authority expanded gradually over the life of the
1898 Act. 60 Referees were effectively adjudicating a broad range of questions
relevant to the administration of the case by the mid-1930's, and this trend toward
more of a judicial role was advanced further by the Chandler Act in 193861 adoption
of a salary-based system of compensating referees in 1946,62 and further restrictions
on referees' ability to serve in administrative roles in 1968.63
Although referees became increasingly judicial in character during the 1898
Act's eighty-year history, they were hardly perceived in the same light as other
judges. As Referee Daniel R. Cowans informed new referees in 1964, "Congress
has charged the Referees with the task of making judicial determinations but has
withheld from us virtually everything customarily associated in the minds of the bar
and the public with the judiciary."6 4 Cowans' remarks ran the gamut from the
absence of the formal trappings of the judicial role (their ambiguous "referee" title
and fact that they did not wear robes), poor administrative support (makeshift
courtrooms and lack of staff), and perceived lack of authority (lack of contempt
power and the relative ease and low costs associated with the review of referee
orders). 65
In 1973, the Supreme Court recognized that referees had evolved into a
primarily judicial role, altering the title of the office in the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure to "bankruptcy judge." Jurisdiction over disputes "was defacto expanded
56 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5969 (stating referees'
orders were not given same finality as under present law, and District Court review of referee's decisions
occurred by "petition for review").
57 Id.
58 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 46a (1970) (repealed 1979)).
59 id.
60 1973 NBRC Report, supra note 14, at 94 ("A study of the relevant legislation reveals a clear and steady
enhancement of the status of the bankruptcy referee as a judicial officer.").
61 Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
62 See Referees' Salary Act of 1946, ch. 512, § 6, Pub. L. No. 79-464, 60 Stat. 323, 326-27 (placing
bankruptcy referees on salary). This Act also extended referee terms from 2 years to 6 years. Id. (dividing
referees into classes with set terms).
63 See Bankruptcy Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-414, 80 Stat. 135 (forbidding referees from acting as
trustee or receiver in bankruptcy proceeding).
64 DANIEL R. CowANs, Contested and Non-Contested Matters, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEMINAR FOR
NEWLY APPOINTED REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY 206 (1964).
65 Id. at 206-08; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 17 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5969
("[The] subordinate position of the bankruptcy court has generated disrespect for it as an institution, which
causes attorneys to avoid the system, even at great cost, and creditors, with millions of dollars at stake, to
doubt the legitimacy of the operation and decisions of the bankruptcy court.").
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by a clarification of what constituted consent to jurisdiction by an adverse party"
and "more of the bankruptcy judge's administrative duties were removed from
him." 66 As noted in the House Report concerning the proposed modernization of the
bankruptcy law noted in 1977, "[t]he thrust of the Bankruptcy Rules, more than any
change in the preceding 40 years, was to recognize the judicial character of the
office of bankruptcy judge, and the primary judicial nature of the work the
bankruptcy judge performs and the contact creditors and debtor alike have with the
bankruptcy judge." 6 7
Notwithstanding the Court's recognition of the judicial character of referees'
work, their second-class status in the federal system remained. 68 As noted in the
1977 House Report:
Bankruptcy judges have no control over their office space, office
equipment, or furnishings, either. They do not participate in the
budgeting process in the Judicial Conference and have little or no
input into the budget the Conference submits to Congress. They
have only limited access to legal libraries, though essential to their
judicial role, and have repeatedly been denied their request that
they be provided better facilities.
Moreover, bankruptcy judges do not participate in the decision-
making process that affects their court. They have been excluded
from Judicial Conference activities that determine administrative
matters for the bankruptcy courts on the ground that they are not
true judges. They have been denied membership on the Judicial
Conference Bankruptcy Committee, and have been denied any
opportunity to be heard before that Committee. The Judicial
Conference made every effort to exclude bankruptcy judges from
Commission membership as well. 69
To some degree, this bias against bankruptcy judges was self-fulfilling, making it
"virtually impossible to attract the highest caliber judges to the bankruptcy
bench.o70
In addition to their lower standing, referees' authority remained limited in
critical and time-consuming ways. The distinction between summary matters
(which could be adjudicated by referees) and plenary matters (which could not)
66 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 9.
67 Id.
68 For an excellent, thorough account of this perception, see Linda Coco, Stigma, Prestige and the Cultural
Context of Debt: A Critical Analysis of the Bankruptcy Judge's Non-Article III Status, 16 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 181 (2011) (arguing that collectively held cultural beliefs about insolvency paired with history of
bankruptcy practice diminish status of bankruptcy courts).
69 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 15-16.
70 Id at 17.
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fueled extensive litigation that, in some cases, devoured any efficiency gains of
summary proceedings.' Some of these bankruptcy proceedings had to proceed in
other (and, at times, distant) courts, where they were typically a low priority.7 2
Moreover, the costs and time required to litigate in these other forums frequently
led trustees to forego litigation that may have benefited the estate.7 3
C. The Bankruptcy Code of 19 78
An admitted neophyte in matters of bankruptcy law,74 the Federal Farmer's
fears concerning the federal usurpation of civil causes may not have been widely
shared at the time, but it appears prescient in light of the law's evolution during the
following two centuries. Both the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Code were
structured to sweep most disputes into federal court, provide for estimation of
complex and time-consuming unliquidated disputes,75  and allow debtors to
commence their own bankruptcy cases.7 6 The Bankruptcy Code advanced this
consolidation potential further by, among other things, expanding "claims" to
include virtually any right to payment or equitable remedy and granting the
federal court overseeing a case jurisdiction over substantially all disputes arising in,
arising under, or related to the case. 78 The Code also expanded the category of
71 See Hon. Leif M. Clark, Jury Trials and Bankruptcy: Getting the Procedures Right, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Apr. 2001 at 26, 26 n.1 (2001) ("The old summary/plenary distinction led to costly and time-
consuming litigation over whether a given matter was one or the other. It also drove up the cost of
bankruptcy reorganization, requiring counsel to conduct litigation in multiple forums at the same time. Most
nefariously, it offered numerous opportunities for abuse to those intent on frustrating the bankruptcy
process."); William Van Dercreek, Article III Versus Bankruptcy Judges and Magistrates-A Partial
Triumph of Principles of Separation of Powers Over the Pragmatism of Docket Congestion, 10 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 569, 574 n.25 (1982) ("Agreeing that the pre-1978 summary/plenary dichotomy resulted in wasteful
litigation, undue cost and general inefficiency, there was no call for a return to this system by the witnesses
appearing in the hearings before the congressional committee on the Northern Pipeline problem.").
72 H.R. REP. No. 95-595.
73 Id. (noting that "it is common knowledge that trustees have often foregone litigation to recover assets of
estates because of the potential expense and other difficulties of litigating in distant courts, having limited
resources with which to wage such litigation").
74 FEDERAL FARMER, LETTER IV (Oct. 12, 1787), accessed at http://www.contitution.org/afp/fedfar04.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
75 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2006) (stating an estimation for unliquidated claims which would delay case
must occur); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 560, § 57d (repealed 1979) (stating proven claims
must be allowed unless otherwise noted); Harvey J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related Litigants as Holders of
Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-Manville
Reorganization (Second Installment), 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 159, 160-63 (1988) (discussing estimation under
the 1898 Act and Bankruptcy Code).
76 11 U.S.C. § 301 (providing opportunity for debtor to file voluntary case); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch.
541, 30 Stat. 547, § 4(a) (repealed 1979) ("Any person who owes debts ... shall be entitled to the benefits of
this Act as a voluntary bankrupt."). Prior to 1910, however, corporations could not file voluntary
bankruptcies under the 1898 Act. Bankruptcy Act of 1910, ch. 412, 36 Stat. 839, § 3 (1910) (allowing
corporations, except those specifically enumerated, to voluntarily file for bankruptcy).
77 11 U.S.C. §101(5)(A) (2006).
78 28 U.S.C. §1334(a) (2006).
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debtors who could commence bankruptcy cases beyond those who were insolvent.79
This system suggests a potential for practically any debtor to qualify for
bankruptcy, select a bankruptcy venue believed to be more favorable to her
interests, and draw virtually any related dispute into that forum. 80
In addition to expanding the substantive breadth of the matters to be adjudicated
in bankruptcy, the Commission sought to complete the transition of referees under
the 1898 Act into wholly judicial officers under the Code.81 The numerous
administrative functions of referees under the 1898 Act-including the examination
at the first meeting of creditors, selection and supervision of a trustee, and possible
role in directing the trustee to pursue matters over which the referee would
subsequently preside-created a clear perception of bias, if not an actual conflict of
interest. 82 Accordingly, the Commission recommended that "bankruptcy judges be
removed from the administration of bankrupt estates and be restricted to the
performance of essentially judicial functions, that is, primarily to the resolution of
disputes or issues involving adversary parties and matters appropriate for judicial
determination." 83 As such, the Commission further recommended that bankruptcy
judges be appointed under Article III and enjoy the associated protections.8 4
The recommended creation of Article III bankruptcy courts drew strong
opposition.85 Chief Justice Warren Burger led the charge, actively lobbying
members of Congress against this aspect of the proposed law.86 Although the
criticism was frequently framed as a concern about the expansion of the Article III
judiciary generally, these concerns did not preclude the creation of other Article III
courts in the 1950's.87 Even so, the number of judges required by the growing
79 See Brown, supra note 13, at 847 ("[T]he insolvency requirement was omitted to serve the goals of
'preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors' by ensuring timely access
to the bankruptcy process.") (quoting Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526
U.S. 434, 453 (1999)).
80 See generally G. Marcus Cole & Todd J. Zywicki, Anna Nicole Smith Goes Shopping: The New Forum-
Shopping Problem In Bankruptcy, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 511, 517-18 (stating language of 28 U.S.C. § 157 can
be construed to include almost any matter related to bankruptcy).
81 See generally Martin I. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1979)
(explaining bankruptcy courts, headed by appointed judges, have expanded jurisdiction).
82 1973 NBRC Report, supra note 14, at 93 (explaining referee's involvement in administering bankruptcy
estate).
83 Id. at 94.
84 Id. at 94-95 (discussing appointment, terms, and compensation of bankruptcy judges).
85 See, e.g., Hon. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of1978 Part 2: The Third Branch Reacts, 81 Am. BANKR. L.J. 165, 170 (2008) (discussing
the hostility of sitting Article III judges to the proposed Article III status of bankruptcy courts).
86 See, e.g., id. at 167 (discussing the "open warfare [that] raged within the judiciary").
87 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-755, § 1, 72 Stat. 848 (discussing
authority of circuit and district judges); Customs Court Act of 1956, Pub. L. 703 ch. 589, 70 Stat. 532
(discussing assignment authority of Chief Justice of United States); Court of Claims Act of 1953, Pub. L.
158, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226 (establishing courts under article III of United States Constitution). However, the
Judicial Conference successfully lobbied against Article III status for tax courts on similar grounds in 1969.
See Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: A Historical Analysis, 41 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1971)
(stating that name change to United States Tax Court did not affect court's status because protections given
to most federal judges only apply to courts created pursuant to Article III of Constitution).
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volume of bankruptcy cases meant a sudden and dramatic influx of new Article III
judges for the purpose of administering a novel bankruptcy scheme. And if this
untested system failed spectacularly, these judges, perhaps lacking the pedigree of
other Article III judges, could not be removed or demoted to referee or comparable
status.
Ultimately, the opponents of Article III status prevailed. The Code eliminated
referees and replaced them with bankruptcy judges appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. 88 Unlike Article III judges, bankruptcy judges
would serve 14-year terms (as opposed to enjoying life tenure); could be removed
by the judicial council of the relevant circuit due to incompetence, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or mental or physical disability (as opposed to Article III judges,
who may be removed involuntarily only by impeachment); and could have their
salaries reduced at will (Article III judges' salaries may not be reduced while in
office). 89
Although they lacked Article III status and protection, the transformation of
referees filling both administrative and judicial functions into bankruptcy judges
serving in an exclusively judicial capacity was complete under the Code.
Substantially all of their remaining case administration tasks under the 1898 Act
were transferred to others, including the appointment of trustees (now overseen by
the Office of the United States Trustee). 90 They enjoyed sweeping authority over
matters arising in, arising under, and related to the cases before them. 91 They could
hold litigants in contempt and possessed considerable other equitable authority
pursuant to section 105(a) of the Code.92 In sum, bankruptcy judges under the Code
carried the formal trappings, court management authority, and judicial powers
ordinarily associated with Article III judges, notwithstanding the manner in which
they were appointed, paid or subject to removal.
D. Northern Pipeline v. Marathon
The Supreme Court considered the novel structure of the bankruptcy courts
under the Code a mere four years after its passage. Marathon involved the debtor's
breach of contract action against Marathon Pipe Line Co. in bankruptcy court.9 3
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982) (discussing impact of new
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 on judicial system).
89 See id at 53 (highlighting distinctions between bankruptcy judges and Article III judges after
Bankruptcy Act of 1978).
90 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5969.
91 Marathon, 458 U.S. at 54 (noting that "jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts created by the Act is much
broader than that exercised under the former referee system").
92 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an
issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.").
93 Marathon, 458 U.S. at 56.
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Marathon filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the new Article I bankruptcy
judges could not constitutionally exercise Article III judicial power over the
dispute.94 The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the district court reversed.95
Although five justices agreed that the bankruptcy court could not decide the dispute,
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion (joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens) offered a far more sweeping condemnation of the new bankruptcy
structure than Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion (joined by Justice O'Connor).
The plurality opinion in Marathon began by stressing the importance of an
"independent judiciary":
[O]ur Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental
principle-that the "judicial Power of the United States" must be
reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the
independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides
clear institutional protections for that independence. 96
These institutional protections simply did not exist with respect to bankruptcy
courts; indeed, none of the parties argued otherwise. 97
The focal point of the plurality opinion was the debtor's contention that the
bankruptcy court structure did not "impermissibly encroach upon the judicial
power" because Congress could have established bankruptcy courts as specialized
legislative courts.98 Justice Brennan, however, reasoned that these courts had been
limited to adjudication of public rights, which the Court characterized as "matters
arising between the Government and persons subject to its authority in connection
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments, and only to matters that historically could have been determined
exclusively by those departments." 99 By contrast, private rights-"the liability of
one individual to another under the law as defined"-"lie at the core of the
historically recognized judicial power" and may not be removed from Article III
courts.'00
When evaluating the propriety of Article I adjudication of rights, the plurality
stressed the "critical difference between rights created by federal statute and rights
recognized by the Constitution."' 0' In electing to create rights in a federal statute,
Congress "clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions,
or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide that persons
seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created to
94Id at 56-57.
95 Id at 57.
961d at 60.
97 Id (noting bankruptcy judges do not have same constitutional protections as Article III judges).
98 Id at 63.
99 Id at 67-68 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
100 Id. at 69-70.
101 Id. at 83.
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perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right." 02 The power to
delegate this role to an Article I decision maker is merely "incidental" to the right
itself; it is part and parcel of the exercise of the legislative power to create the
right.103 By contrast, if the right exists independent of congressional action,
Congress' decision to assign its adjudication to an Article I tribunal is not, by
definition, an extension of the legislative authority that created the right. Rather,
"such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the
United States, which our Constitution reserves for Article III courts."10 4
Within this framework, the plurality easily concluded that the contract dispute
at issue was not a public right matter subject to Article I adjudication:
Appellants argue that a discharge in bankruptcy is indeed a "public
right," similar to such congressionally created benefits as "radio
station licenses, pilot licenses, or certificates for common carriers"
granted by administrative agencies. But the restructuring of debtor-
creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created
private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is
at issue in this case. The former may well be a "public right," but
the latter obviously is not. Appellant Northern's right to recover
contract damages to augment its estate is "one of private right, that
is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as
defined."'s
In short, the transformation of referees into bankruptcy judges fulfilling "essentially
judicial functions" only may have been complete under the Code, but the absence of
Article III protections for these judges precluded their adjudication over a
substantial number of disputes necessary to carry out the Code's streamlined
adjudication scheme.
E. Marathon's Perceived Demise
1. The 1984 Amendments
The Marathon plurality's broad rejection of the Code's original bankruptcy
court structure demanded prompt action, but the process to amend the structure bore
an eerie similarity to a number of failed bankruptcy cases: advocates with veiled
interests drawing lines in the sand, representations that the key issues were being
resolved even as the discussions lingered for months and then years, and, finally, a
102 id
103 Id at83-84.
104 Id at 84.
'os Id at71-72.
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compromise based on a dubious reading of the law and creating at least as many
problems as it solved.10 6 Congress appeared in no great rush to respond to the
problem, and Chief Justice Burger, one of the three dissenting justices in Marathon,
continued to lobby against the most obvious solution: elevation of bankruptcy
courts under the Code to Article III status.1o' In the interim, the bankruptcy system
operated under the Emergency Rule, which effectively allowed the lower courts to
continue accepting and administering bankruptcy cases through the provisions that
were arguably not invalidated by Marathon.108 Ultimately, the hazy nature of the
public and private rights dichotomy in the bankruptcy context left considerable
room to argue that Article III status was not required, yielding an uneasy
compromise that was virtually certain to draw subsequent challenges.109
The proverbial sausage made by this process, the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, "o included mostly patchwork modifications to the
court structure that tracked the Emergency Rule."' Under the Act, the authority to
appoint or remove bankruptcy judges was transferred to the judicial council for the
applicable circuit.1 2 Bankruptcy judgeships remained term appointments (14
years), and bankruptcy courts were structured as "adjuncts" to the applicable federal
district court.1 3  Under this framework, the 1984 Amendments conferred
jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related
to cases under title 11" on district courts, who were authorized to refer any or all of
these proceedings to bankruptcy judges.114
With respect to the substantive matters that may be decided by Article I
bankruptcy courts, the 1984 Amendments did not track the Marathon plurality's
public and private dichotomy. Rather, bankruptcy courts were authorized to
adjudicate core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157 or noncore proceedings with the
consent of the parties." 5 Proceedings that "arise under" or "arise in" a bankruptcy
case were core, while those that are merely "related to" the bankruptcy case were
106 Cf Vern Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (1983)
(arguing emergency rule will bring about "chaos" and is "wholly unworkable").
107 See Countryman, supra note 8, at 8-9 (discussing judicial committee's reluctance to give bankruptcy
judges Article III status).
108 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 3.10[2][b] n.15, at 3-107-3-110 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009) (discussing emergency rule and including its text); Countryman, Emergency
Rule, supra note 106, at 1-3 (1983) (outlining reasoning behind emergency rule).
109 As explained in Part IID, however, the 1984 Amendments also made it likely that few of these
challenges would return to the Supreme Court.
110 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
1 At the time, this was a perplexing decision given the widespread view among the Justice Department
and many leading scholars that the Emergency Rule was "unworkable and of doubtful constitutionality."
Stuart Taylor Jr., Fate of Bankruptcy System in Doubt, N.Y. TIES, Dec. 20, 1982, at Dl.
112 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2006).
1 13 id.
114Id. at§ 1334.
115 Id. at §§157(b)(1), (c)(2). The statute does not clearly outline the parameters of what constitutes
"consent" for these purposes.
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not.1 6 If one or more parties did not consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of a
noncore dispute, the amendments nonetheless permitted the court to hear the
proceeding and make proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but only the
district court could enter a final order after reviewing the bankruptcy court's
recommendations de novo."7
2. Subsequent Article I Adjudication Cases: Thomas and Schor
In the two years following the 1984 Amendments, the Supreme Court issued a
pair of opinions that appeared to supplant the Marathon plurality's reasoning or, at
the very least, limit its effect. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products
Co.,118 for example, the Court characterized the Marathon plurality as
"establish[ing] only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power
to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional
contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject
only to ordinary appellate review."ll 9 The following term, the Court stressed that
"the absence of consent to an initial adjudication before a non-Article III tribunal"
was a "significant factor" in Marathon;12 0 a factor that might be uncommon given
the "core" and "non-core" distinction under the 1984 Amendments and the
historically broad conception of "consent" in bankruptcy.
Thomas focused on Congress' power to require registrants under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to submit data-sharing
compensation disputes to binding arbitration.121 Under FIFRA, registrants must
submit research data concerning a pesticide's health, safety, and environmental
effects to the EPA.122 To protect the proprietary interests of first submitters in this
data, Congress adopted a provision requiring subsequent registrants to compensate
original data submitters for the use of this data in the registration process. 23 If the
parties could not agree on the amount of compensation, FIFRA provided that either
party could invoke binding arbitration.12 4
116 Id. at § 157(a) (noting that "proceedings arising under ... arising in or related to a case under title 11
shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district"). This determination does not rely on the federal or
state law basis of the dispute. See id. at § 157(b)(3) ("A determination that a proceeding is not a core
proceeding shall not be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State law.").
117,Id at§ 157(c)(1).
118 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
119 Idat 584.
120 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849 (1986).
121 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571-75 (analyzing whether Congress is prohibited from "selecting binding
arbitration" under Article III "as a mechanism for resolving disputes among participants in FIFRA's pesticide
registration scheme").
122 Id at 571.
123 See id. at 571-72 (noting that mandatory data-licensing scheme was instituted to "streamline pesticide
registration procedures, increase competition, . . . avoid unnecessary duplication of data-generation costs,"
and protect proprietary interests of preliminary registrants of data).
124 See id at 573 (indicating that binding arbitration may be requested by either party if parties fail to
resolve compensation disputes).
198 [Vol. 20: 179
CONSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN BANKRUPTCY
Rather than follow the Marathon plurality's rigid limits on legislative courts, the
Thomas majority embraced a functional analysis, noting that "practical attention to
substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform
application of Article III."25 Instead of drawing a bright line for constitutionally
permissible assignment of adjudication to a non-Article III forum, the Court
reasoned that "the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding
that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that 'could
be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,' the danger
of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced." 26
Under this approach, the majority concluded that Congress could create "a
seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme
as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the
Article III judiciary." 27 This was clearly the case in Thomas because "it is the
'mandatory licensing provision' that creates the relationship between the data
submitter and the follow-on registrant, and federal law supplies the rule of decision"
concerning the original data submitter's compensation rights.128 As the court
expounded later in the opinion:
[T]he right created by FIFRA is not a purely "private" right, but
bears many of the characteristics of a "public" right. Use of a
registrant's data to support a follow-on registration serves a public
purpose as an integral part of a program safeguarding the public
health. Congress has the power, under Article I, to authorize an
agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to allocate costs
and benefits among voluntary participants in the program without
providing an Article III adjudication. It also has the power to
condition issuance of registrations or licenses on compliance with
agency procedures. Article III is not so inflexible that it bars
Congress from shifting the task of data valuation from the agency
to the interested parties.129
For much the same reason, Justice Brennan concluded that the data-sharing
compensation structure withstood scrutiny under the Marathon standard as well.' 30
With respect to the perceived intrusion into the judiciary's role, the Court
reasoned that the "danger of Congress or the Executive encroaching on the Article
125 Id at 587.
126 Id at 589.
127 Id at 594.
128 Id at 585.
129 Id at 589.
130 Id. at 600-01 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Although a compensation dispute under FIFRA ultimately
involves a determination of the duty owed one private party by another, at its heart the dispute involves the
exercise of authority by a Federal Government arbitrator in the course of administration of FIFRA's
comprehensive regulatory scheme. As such it partakes of the characteristics of a standard agency
adjudication.").
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III judicial powers is at a minimum when no unwilling defendant is subjected to
judicial enforcement power as a result of the agency 'adjudication.""' To that end,
any perceived intrusion was minor because, "under FIFRA, the only potential object
of judicial enforcement power is the follow-on registrant who explicitly consents to
have his rights determined by arbitration." 32
A year later, the majority in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor 33 followed the Thomas approach when evaluating the CFTC's ability to
exercise jurisdiction over state law counterclaims to a former client's claims against
a broker.134 Although the adjudication of common law counterclaims broke from
the traditional agency model, this single deviation was minor, and the majority was
reluctant "to endorse an absolute prohibition on such jurisdiction out of fear of
where some hypothetical 'slippery slope' may deposit us."l 3 5 Moreover, the Court
expressly noted that plaintiff consented to the CFTC's jurisdiction by pursuing an
administrative resolution of his claim against the broker and expressly demanding
that the broker litigate the counterclaim in the administrative proceeding.136 This
was consistent with Katchen v. Landry,137 a case under the Bankruptcy Act, in
which the Court "upheld a bankruptcy referee's power to hear and decide state law
counterclaims against a creditor who filed a claim in bankruptcy when those
counterclaims arose out of the same transaction." 3 8
3. Granfinanciera v. Nordberg
The public/private dichotomy under the Bankruptcy Code arose yet again in
Granfinanciera v. Nordberg.13 9 In that case, the Chase & Sanborn Corporation
commenced chapter 11 proceedings that ultimately led to an approved plan of
reorganization.140 The trustee, who was authorized to pursue fraudulent conveyance
actions under the plan, filed a fraudulent transfer action against Granfinanciera,
S.A. pursuant to sections 548(a)(1), (a)(2) and 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.141
The district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, after which the
defendant requested and was denied a jury trial.142 The trustee prevailed at trial, and
131 Id. at 591.
132 Id. at 592.
133 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
134 Id. at 854 (finding Thomas approach applies to state law character of claim).
135 Id. at 852.
136 Id. at 849 (acknowledging plaintiff waived any possible right to trial of counterclaim by demanding to
proceed in reparations proceeding).
137 382 U.S. 323, 335 (1966) (upholding idea that by presenting counterclaim, parties subject themselves to
consequences).
138 Schor, 478 U.S. at 852.
139 492 U.S. 33, 55 (1989) (discussing whether trustee's right to recover fraudulent conveyance is public or
private).
140 Id. at 36.
141 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)-(2), 550(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1982) (explaining fraudulent transfers);
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36 (describing trustee's actions concerning fraudulent transfers).
142 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36-37.
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the district court and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.14 3 The Supreme
Court reversed.144
In reaching its decision, the majority once again distinguished public and
private rights. Specifically, although acknowledging Congress may create new
public rights and assign their adjudication to an Article I decision maker, the Court
reasoned that it "lacks the power to strip parties contesting matters of private right
of their constitutional right to a trial by jury." 45 More pointedly, the majority
rejected the suggestion that the incorporation of existing private rights into the
statutory framework was sufficient to transform them into public rights:
The decisive point is that in neither the 1978 Act nor the 1984
Amendments did Congress "creat[e] a new cause of action, and
remedies therefor, unknown to the common law," because
traditional rights and remedies were inadequate to cope with a
manifest public problem. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S., at 461. Rather,
Congress simply reclassified a pre-existing, common-law cause of
action that was not integrally related to the reformation of debtor-
creditor relations and that apparently did not suffer from any grave
deficiencies. This purely taxonomic change cannot alter our
Seventh Amendment analysis. Congress cannot eliminate a party's
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely by relabeling the
cause of action to which it attaches and placing exclusive
jurisdiction in an administrative agency or a specialized court of
equity.146
Justice Scalia's concurrence suggested that he would have gone further, limiting
public rights to those disputes arising between the government and others.14 7
4. The Constitutional Gap
Where the Marathon plurality took a wrecking ball to the constitutional
foundations of the bankruptcy court structure, the 1984 Amendments merely
spackled and painted over the resulting hole. The 1984 Amendments did little to
alter the day-to-day operation of the bankruptcy courts and the breadth of the
matters over which they preside.14 8 District courts rarely retain or withdraw the
143 Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988).
144 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. 33.
1
4 5 Id at 51-52.
146 Id at 60-61 (internal citations omitted).
147 Id. at 67 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The notion that the power to adjudicate a legal controversy between
two private parties may be assigned to a non-Article III, yet federal, tribunal is entirely inconsistent with the
origins of the public rights doctrine.").
148 See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 659 (2008) (explaining ramifications of Marathon decision did little to effect day
to day operations of bankruptcy system).
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reference in bankruptcy cases, and then only due to extreme circumstances.14 9
Bankruptcy courts exercise full authority over substantially all core matters,150 and
they preside over a broad range of non-core matters subject to de novo review.
The net result was a constitutionally uneasy framework for bankruptcy
adjudication in the years following the amendments. Neither Thomas nor Schor
expressly overruled the public/private dichotomy, and Granfinanciera relied upon it
heavily. The Court has not provided significant guidance as to the parameters of
public law in the bankruptcy context, although most of the Justices appear open to
the possibility that it is broader than Justice Scalia's Granfinanciera concurrence
suggests. Moreover, each of the cases drew upon the effective consent (Thomas
and Schor) or utter absence of consent (Marathon and Granfinanciera) in reaching
their conclusions, regardless of the test applied, but none of the cases addressed the
varying ranges of implied consent between the extremes.
After the relatively rapid succession of public/private rights cases decided by
the Court in the 1980's, more than two decades would pass before the Court
revisited the bankruptcy court structure in Marshall. As with other constitutional
gaps in bankruptcy history, the Code's structure largely served its intended purpose
in more than 29 million bankruptcy cases filed since Marathon.15 2 Bankruptcy
courts hear a substantial majority of the matters relevant to any given bankruptcy
case, leaving district courts free to manage their own growing dockets. In many
respects, the bankruptcy process follows the original statutory design and, for the
most part, operates as intended by the authors of the Code.
This temporal constitutional gap may be explained by several complimentary
factors. The expansive conception of consent in bankruptcy cases and proceedings,
including the widely embraced view that a creditor's decision to file a proof of
claim waives the right to Article III adjudication of the claim and any
counterclaims,153 has effectively swept many private right matters into bankruptcy
core jurisdiction. Even in the absence of consent, the ability to frame appellate
review as de novo (even if the proceeding ultimately does not strike the unhappy
litigant as such) has largely allowed district courts to refer numerous non-core
matters to bankruptcy courts that might otherwise remain at the district court under
149 See George A. Martinez, The Res Judicata Effect of Bankruptcy Judgments: The Procedural and
Constitutional Concerns, 62 Mo. L. REv. 9, 17 (1997) ("Although district courts have jurisdiction over
bankruptcy matters, they rarely exercise that jurisdiction.").
150 Bankruptcy judges are required to determine whether a matter is core or non-core. 28 U.S.C. §
157(b)(3) (2006) ("The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge's own motion or on timely motion of
a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding."). Nonetheless, many orders simply assert that a matter is
core without further analysis or resolve matters that are core and non-core collectively. For example, an
order confirming a plan of reorganization is core, but some of the specific findings of fact and conclusions of
law within the order relate only to non-core matters.
151 Id. at § 157(c)(1).
152 A detailed table of bankruptcy filings per year may be found at Annual Business and Non-business
Filings by Year (1980-2008), supra note 11.
153 See, e.g., Bankr. Servs. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 466-67 (2d Cir.
2008) (stating that, by filing proof of claim, creditors subject themselves to bankruptcy court's jurisdiction).
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Marathon.154 Perhaps most significant is the fact that financial self-interest serves as
an intrinsic limitation on bankruptcy appeals generally; the lengthy appellate
process in bankruptcy will often cost more to see to conclusion than the litigants
stand to gain if they ultimately prevail. 55
F. Stern v. Marshall
The majority's comparison of the dispute at the center of Stern v. Marshall to
Dicken's Bleak House 56 was fitting, even if some observers understandably found it
clich6.' 5 ' The case involved an expansive but widely embraced view of consent, a
procedural history that effectively precluded de novo review, and a series of appeals
driven by both the high stakes of the litigation and a degree of personal animus that
was severe enough to survive the passing of the original litigants. Even so, in the
absence of several discrete events occurring as they did, it seems unlikely that the
case would have wound its way to the Court.
1. Background
Although Marshall stemmed from an appeal of an order from the court
overseeing the Vickie Lynn Marshall (better known by her stage name, Anna
Nicole Smith) bankruptcy, the proceeding in question was little more than a probate
dispute. Prior to the death of her husband, J. Howard Marshall, Vickie commenced
litigation in Texas probate court to invalidate his estate plan, orchestrated by J.
Howard's son, Pierce Marshall, on the grounds of fraud and undue influence.158
Pierce commenced a separate defamation proceeding against Vickie and her
attorneys in Texas court based on her attorneys' representations to the press that
Pierce obtained J. Howard's approval of the estate plan by fraud.159
Ostensibly due to an $884,607.98 default judgment on a sexual misconduct
claim filed against her by a former housekeeper,160 Vickie commenced a voluntary
chapter 11 case in the Central District of California a few months after J. Howard's
death.161 In May 1996, Pierce initiated an adversary proceeding in Vickie's chapter
154 See, e.g., In re Blackwell, 279 B.R. 818, 822 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2002) (noting non-core matters can be
heard by bankruptcy court following Marathon).
155 See, e.g., Fry v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 F.R.D. 461, 474 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (weighing costs and length
of appeal against potential benefits recovered).
156 Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2011) (comparing Marshall's dragged-out litigation to Bleak
House).
157 See, e.g., Bob Lawless, Anna Nicole Smith May Be More Than Just the Only Loser on This One,
CREDIT SLIPS (June 23, 2011), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/06/anna-nicole-smith-may-be-
more-than-just-the-only-loser-on-this-one.html (remarking on cliche reference).
In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002).
15 9 Id. at 8-9.
160 Id. at 9 n.3. The sexual harassment claim was settled shortly after the bankruptcy case was filed. Id.
161 Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting Vickie filed for chapter
11 on January 25, 1996); Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating
J. Howard died on August 4, 1995).
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11 case seeking a determination that her liability on any future defamation suit was
not dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a) of the Code.' 62 Two months later,
Pierce filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case, to which he attached a copy of
the complaint from the adversary proceeding.163 Vickie objected to the proof of
claim and asserted several counterclaims, including fraud and tortious interference
with an inter-vivos gift.164 The district court initially withdrew the reference with
respect to the adversary proceeding but subsequently reversed course and referred
the matter to the bankruptcy court for adjudication.16 5
Notwithstanding Pierce's occasional protests that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction over the claim and counterclaim,166 the matter remained with the
bankruptcy court. Citing Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, the
bankruptcy court concluded that, "[b]y filing a claim, a claimant voluntarily submits
to the equity jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court for the allowance and disallowance
of all claims made by the claimant against the bankruptcy estate or made against the
claimant by the bankruptcy estate's representative."l67 As a result, Pierce
"voluntarily submitted himself to the bankruptcy court's equity jurisdiction as to all
claims by the estate against him," including the Vickie's fraud and undue influence
counterclaim. 68
On November 5, 1999, the bankruptcy court granted Vickie summary judgment
with respect to Pierce's defamation claim.169 Specifically, the bankruptcy court
concluded that "Vickie had published no statements about Pierce, had not ratified
any statements about Pierce made by her attorneys, and was not otherwise
vicariously liable for any statements her attorneys had made about Pierce." 7 0
Roughly eleven months later, the bankruptcy court ruled in Vickie's favor on her
probate counterclaims, awarding her nearly $450 million in damages.
On appeal, Pierce argued that the probate counterclaims were non-core matters
requiring Article III adjudication under Marathon. In its order dated June 19, 2001,
the district court agreed.172 Accordingly, the district court explained that it would
"engage in a comprehensive, complete, and independent review of the bankruptcy
162 In re Marshall, 264 B.R. 609, 616 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
163 Id
164 Id These counterclaims are collectively referred to hereafter as the "probate counterclaims."
165 Id
166 In re Marshall, 257 B.R. 35, 36 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000) ("E. Pierce Marshall continues to complain
that this court lacks jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding because this claim belongs in the probate
case now in trial in Texas. Notably, however, he has never brought a motion on this subject on proper notice
pursuant to this court's motion rules. For this reason alone this issue has never been properly brought before
this court, and E. Pierce Marshall is entitled to no relief on this subject.") [hereinafter, Bankruptcy Opinion].
167 Id at 37 (emphasis in original).
168 Id
169 In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 9 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
1
7 0 Marshall, 264 B.R. at 616.
17 dat 616-17.
1
7 2 See id. at 626.
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court's record and may, if warranted, hear additional testimony from the parties and
witnesses."' 73
At the same time, proceedings continued in the Texas probate court overseeing
the matters initiated by Vickie in 1995. Following the bankruptcy court's order
concerning the probate counterclaims but prior to the district court's review of that
order, the jury in the five-week trial in the probate proceedings returned a verdict in
favor of Pierce.174 The jury's findings conflicted with the bankruptcy court's prior
determination of a number of critical facts, including: (1) the Living Trust and will
were valid and had not been forged or altered; (2) J. Howard Marshall II had not
been the victim of fraud or undue influence; (3) he had the requisite mental capacity
when he executed his Living Trust and will; and (4) he did not have an agreement
with Vickie Lynn Marshall that he would give her one-half of all his property. In
August 2001, the probate court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's
findings.176
Following the entry of judgment in probate court, Pierce moved for summary
judgment in the district court based on claim and issue preclusion.'77 The district
court denied the motion.178 Among other reasons, the district court concluded that
summary judgment was inappropriate given that the matter had already been
litigated in bankruptcy court and was merely subject to de novo review.179 Although
the court remained open to consideration of new evidence, it was not bound to do
so; it could have merely reviewed the record in accordance with prevailing practice
when de novo review is required.180 And given the practical operation of the
process, the court reasoned that de novo review "is more akin to an appeal" than an
initial adjudication.181 Thus, the district court concluded:
Granting Pierce's motion at this stage, after a full trial had been
conducted, would do nothing to further those interests. Once a trial
has been conducted, there is no judicial economy to applying res
judicata or collateral estoppel, no needless litigation has been
prevented, few, if any judicial resources have been saved, and the
parties have in no way spared themselves (or the courts in three
states) of the vexation of multiple lawsuits. A motion to dismiss or
to grant summary judgment must therefore be brought before a case
has proceeded to trial. Pierce cannot now short-circuit the
173 Id at 633.
174 See Marshall v. Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2004).
175 See id.
176 d
177 See In re Marshall, 271 B.R. 858, 860 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
178 Id at 860.
1
7 9 See id. at 864.
180 See id at 865.
'
81 See id at 865 n.8.
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proceedings under the guise of res judicata or collateral estoppel,
more than two years after it would be appropriate.182
On March 7, 2002, the district court entered a final judgment against Pierce
Marshall, which awarded Vickie $88,585,534.66 for compensatory and punitive
damages, plus costs of suit.183
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially focused on Pierce's argument that the
bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim due to the
probate exception.18 4 In light of the court's conclusion in Pierce's favor on this issue,
the panel decided that it did not need to address the core/non-core question. 8 5 The
Supreme Court ultimately found in Vickie's favor with respect to this issue in 2006
and remanded for further proceedings.186
On remand, the Ninth Circuit determined that the bankruptcy court "exceeded
its statutory grant of power and the constitutional limitations on that power when it
purported to enter a final judgment" and, accordingly, concluded that "the findings
of the Texas probate court should be afforded preclusive effect because it is the
earliest final judgment on matters relevant to this proceeding."l 8 7 The focus of the
court's analysis was 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), which provides that "[c]ore
proceedings include . . . counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims
against the estate."' 8 8 Although the plain language of the statute suggests that any
counterclaim falls within the bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction, the panel
reasoned that such a reading "would permit the bankruptcy court to consider under
section 157(b)(2)(C) counterclaims that are factually and legally unrelated to the
claim being asserted against the bankruptcy estate" and, accordingly, "would
certainly run afoul of the Court's holding in Marathon."'8 9 The panel further
concluded that Vickie's suggestion that the language be read to include only
compulsory counterclaims remained broader than the public/private dichotomy
allowed.190 Thus, in order to avoid interpreting the statute in a manner that would
raise constitutional problems, the panel interpreted the section to apply only to a
counterclaim that is "so closely related to the proof of claim that the resolution of
1
82 See id. at 866.
183 See In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 58 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (awarding Vickie Lynn Marshall compensatory
damages of $44,292,767.33 and punitive damages of $44,292,767.33, plus costs of suit).
184 See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2004).
Cf id at 1130 (explaining that district court concluded that Vickie Lynn Marshall's claim was not
"core" bankruptcy claim); id. at 1137 (reversing all judgments awarded to Vickie Lynn Marshall against E.
Pierce Marshall).
186 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 315 (2006) (reversing Ninth Circuit's decision and remanding
case for further proceedings consistent with Supreme Court's opinion).
187 See Marshall v. Stem (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010).
18 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2006).
189 Marshall, 600 F.3 dat 1057.
190 See id at 1058 (holding that all compulsory counterclaims are not necessarily core proceedings).
206 [Vol. 20: 179
CONSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN BANKRUPTCY
the counterclaim is necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim
itself." 9' Vickie's tortious interference counterclaims did not satisfy this test.' 92
2. The Supreme Court Opinion
Vickie's estate petitioned for certiorari, presenting the following questions for
review:
1. Whether the Ninth Circuit opinion, which renders section
157(b)(2)(C) surplusage in light of section 157(b)(2)(B),
contravenes Congress' intent in enacting section 157(b)(2)(C).
2. Whether Congress may, under Articles I and III, constitutionally
authorize core jurisdiction over debtors' compulsory counterclaims
to proofs of claim.
3. Whether the Ninth Circuit misapplied Marathon and Katchen
and contravened this Court's post-Marathon precedent, creating a
circuit split in the process, by holding that Congress cannot
constitutionally authorize non-Article III bankruptcy judges to enter
final judgment on all compulsory counterclaims to proofs of
claim.19
3
The petition was granted on September 28, 2010.194
In an opinion issued June 23, 2011, a majority of the Court agreed with Vickie's
argument that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) authorized bankruptcy courts to enter final
orders on all counterclaims (Question 1);195 however, the Court further concluded
that this grant of authority was unconstitutional (Question 2)196 and that Pierce did
not consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction over Vickie's counterclaim by filing a
proof of claim (Question 3).197
Drawing upon the plurality and concurring opinions in Marathon, the majority
distinguished matters of public right "that Congress could constitutionally assign to
'legislative' courts for resolution" and state law claims, which Congress could not.198
191 Id
192 See id at 1059 (stating that Vickie's answer, objection and tortious interference claim did not satisfy
test).
193 See Brief of Petitioner at ii Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2010) (No. 10-179), 2010 WL 4688124
at *ii.
194 Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 63 (2010).
195 See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2604-08 (2011) (discussing reasons that bankruptcy court is
able to enter final order).
196 See id. at 2608 ("Although we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter final
judgment on Vickie's counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does not.").
197 See id at 2616.
198 Id at 2610.
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The relevant questions, then, were whether the matter at issue was a private rights
matter and, if so, whether its adjudication was improperly assigned to a non-Article
III forum.
The bankruptcy court was not acting as a mere adjunct of the district court.
The Court's analysis of these questions began by rejecting the argument that the
1984 Amendments rendered bankruptcy courts as Article III adjuncts for
constitutional purposes. Because the bankruptcy court was adjudicating a core
matter, section 157(b)(2)(C) expressly authorizes bankruptcy courts to enter final
orders over those matters, and 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) requires "marked deference to"
bankruptcy judges' findings on appeal; bankruptcy courts exercise the same
statutory authority under the 1984 Amendments as the Court found unconstitutional
in Marathon.199 Accordingly, the court concluded that bankruptcy courts under the
1984 Act could not "be dismissed as mere adjuncts of Article III courts, any more
than could the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act. The judicial powers the
courts exercise in cases such as this remain the same, and a court exercising such
broad powers is no mere adjunct of anyone."2 0 0
The counterclaim was not a "public right" matter.
The majority next surveyed the various formulations of public right over time
and concluded that "Vickie's counterclaim cannot be deemed a matter of 'public
right' that can be decided outside the Judicial Branch." 2 0 1 Although neither
confirming nor rejecting the premise that even the "restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations" might qualify as a public right, 2 02 the majority reasoned that the
counterclaim:
is not a matter that can be pursued only by grace of the other
branches, as in Murray's Lessee, or one that "historically could
have been determined exclusively by" those branches. The claim is
instead one under state common law between two private parties. It
does not "depend on the will of congress;" Congress has nothing to
do with it.203
Moreover, the counterclaim was not sufficiently tied to a public right to justify
delegation to a non-Article III forum. It did not "flow from a federal statutory
199 Id at 2610-11 (explaining authority given to new courts in core proceedings).
200 Id at 2611.
201 Id
202 Id. at 2614 n.7 (noting neither party requested Court reconsider public rights framework for
bankruptcy).
203 Id at 2614 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 66 (1982), and
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 283 (1855), respectively).
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scheme" as in Thomas.20 4 Unlike Schor, its resolution was not "completely
dependent upon adjudication of a claim created by federal law." 2 05 Because
creditors "have no choice but to file their claims in bankruptcy proceedings if they
want to pursue the claims at all," the court reiterated its belief that "the notion of
'consent' does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in other contexts." 20 6
Finally, the authority delegated under section 157(b) was not limited to a
"particularized area of law" within the special expertise of the agency addressing
the dispute, as was the case in Thomas and Schor; rather, it involved a court "with
substantive jurisdiction reaching any area of the corpus juris."20 7 Thus, as the court
summarized:
What is plain here is that this case involves the most prototypical
exercise of judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by
a court with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause
of action, when the action neither derives from nor depends upon
any agency regulatory regime. If such an exercise of judicial power
may nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by
deeming it part of some amorphous "public right," then Article III
would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and
separation of powers we have long recognized into mere wishful
thinking. 208
A proof of claim establishes consent only to hear matters necessarily disposed of in
deciding the claim itself
Even if the filing of the proof of claim did not establish consent to bankruptcy
court adjudication of the counterclaim, Vickie's estate asserted that it sufficiently
altered the nature of the counterclaim to justify bankruptcy court adjudication. 209
Indeed, the bankruptcy court's primary argument in support of jurisdiction hinged
upon the fact that, unlike the defendants in Marathon and Granfinanciera, Pierce
filed a proof of claim.2 10 In Katchen v. Landry,211 an opinion cited favorably in
Granfinanciera, the court stated, "he who invokes the aid of the bankruptcy court
by offering a proof of claim and demanding its allowance must abide the
consequences of that procedure."212 Similarly, in Lagenkamp v. Culp,213 the Court
allowed a preference claim to be heard when a creditor filed a proof of claim
2 04 Id
205 Id
206, dat 2615 n.8.
207 Id at 2615.
208 Id
209 See In re Marshall, 257 B.R. 35, 39 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000).
210 Id at 36, 37.
211 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
212 Id at 333 n.9.
213 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
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because the action thus becomes "integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor
relationship." 2 14 In the time since, several courts, including the bankruptcy court in
Marshall, have interpreted this language to support the proposition that "[b]y filing
a claim, a claimant voluntarily submits to the equity jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court for the allowance and disallowance of all claims made by the claimant against
the bankruptcy estate or made against the claimant by the bankruptcy estate's
representative." 215
The Court's treatment of this argument reveals the danger in reading the
language of an opinion broadly, particularly where its context may suggest far
narrower alternatives. Katchen and Lagenkamp involved the bankruptcy courts'
authority to decide avoidance actions where the defendant filed a proof of claim.
Both the 1898 Act2 16 and the Code, 2 17 however, expressly conditioned allowance of
any claim on the determination that the creditor asserting it was not the recipient of
an avoidable preference or fraudulent conveyance. Thus, by seeking allowance and
payment of the claim, the claimant accepted the court's adjudication of matters
necessary to determine the claimant's right to payment, including the question of
whether the claimant was the recipient of an avoidable transfer." 8 Moreover, the
right of recovery of a preferential transfer is entirely a creation of federal
bankruptcy law and properly brought only in connection with the bankruptcy
219case.
By contrast, the Marshall majority noted, "Pierce's claim for defamation in no
way affects the nature of Vickie's counterclaim for tortious interference as one at
common law that simply attempts to augment the bankruptcy estate-the very type
of claim that we held in Marathon and Granfinanciera must be decided by an
Article III court."2 20 As the Court explained:
In ruling on Vickie's counterclaim, the Bankruptcy Court was
required to and did make several factual and legal determinations
that were not "disposed of in passing on objections" to Pierce's
proof of claim for defamation, which the court had denied almost a
year earlier. There was some overlap between Vickie's
counterclaim and Pierce's defamation claim that led the courts
below to conclude that the counterclaim was compulsory or at least
in an "attenuated" sense related to Pierce's claim. But there was
214 Id at 44 (holding that by filing claim creditor is subject to equitable jurisdiction of bankruptcy court).
215 Marshall, 257 B.R. at 37.
216 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 57(g), 30 Stat. 544, 560 (disallowing claims of creditors paid
preferentially until preferential payments are surrendered).
217 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(d), 547(b) (2006) (instructing court to disallow claims of creditors with property
recoverable under specified sections or from avoidable transfers until property is returned).
218 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616-17 (2011) (discussing necessity of deciding preferential
transfer claim in order to decide allowance or disallowance of bankruptcy claim).
219 See id. at 2618 (noting trustee's right to recover for preferential transfers is provided for in current Code
and also was provided for in former Bankruptcy Act).
220 Id at 2616.
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never any reason to believe that the process of adjudicating Pierce's
proof of claim would necessarily resolve Vickie's counterclaim. 2 2 1
Moreover, unlike Katchen and Lagenkamp, the Court explained that the probate
counterclaim at issue "is in no way derived from or dependent upon bankruptcy
law; it is a state tort action that exists without regard to any bankruptcy
proceeding."222
II. A4RSHALL'S RAMIFICATIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE
Regardless of the long-term significance of the Court's opinion in Marshall, it
has certainly generated a lot of attention. As Lyle Denniston observed immediately
following Marshall, "for bankruptcy lawyers, and for the specialized courts in
which they ply their craft, the decision was as momentous a constitutional ruling on
those courts' authority as was the Justices' decision in the 1982 case of Northern
Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipe Line nullifying an earlier congressional law
against those courts' powers."223 As a matter of law, Marshall highlights the
structural constitutional gap between jurisdiction under the Code and the
constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to exercise that jurisdiction. As a
matter of bankruptcy practice, the case demonstrates how an unconstitutional
provision of a law may nonetheless achieve its purpose during a temporal gap
between its passage and ultimate rejection by the Court. Still, although Marshall
will require bankruptcy courts to focus on matters that are central to their oversight
of bankruptcy cases, it remains unclear that the opinion will necessarily lead to a
substantial alteration of day-to-day bankruptcy practice across cases and
proceedings once the dust clears. This section focuses on the questions that were
answered in Marshall, the manner in which they were addressed, and how the
remaining gaps in the Court's treatment of the public right exception and consent
may influence the future direction of bankruptcy practice.
A. Marshall's "Narrow" Reach
Although Marshall repeats the admonition that "the three branches are not
hermetically sealed from one another," 2 24 it also reminds us that the there are limits
to how far the other branches may venture into the judicial realm:
Article III could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks
and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking
221 Id. at 2617 (citations omitted).
222 Id. at 2618.
223 Lyle Denniston, Opinion analysis: Bankruptcy courts' powers pared down, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 23,
2011, 10:34 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=122710.
224 Marshall, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (acknowledging overlap between judiciary, legislature, executive branches
of government).
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if the other branches of the Federal Government could confer the
Government's "judicial Power" on entities outside Article III. That
is why we have long recognized that, in general, Congress may not
"withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty." When a suit is made of "the stuff of the traditional
actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789,"
and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the
responsibility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges in
Article III courts. The Constitution assigns that job-resolution of
"the mundane as well as the glamorous, matters of common law
and statute as well as constitutional law, issues of fact as well as
issues of law"-to the Judiciary. 2 25
These limitations serve not only to preserve the institutional role of an independent
judiciary as a safeguard against tyranny but also the individual's interest in
adjudicating certain matters before an impartial and independent judge even where
tyranny may arise, at most, at the distant end of an extended slippery slope. 226
This reminder, together with the Court's apparent discomfort with the broad
reach of bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the Code, may be read to suggest that
the Article I bankruptcy structure will not survive scrutiny if the question comes
before the Court. From Chief Justice Marshall's assessment of the constitutionality
of non-Article III courts in American Insurance Co. v. Canter,227 the Court has
frequently stressed the importance of distinguishing courts that exercise the
"judicial power of the United States" from those that do not, even if the latter
perform functions that appear to be judicial. 2 2 8 Notwithstanding the Court's
longstanding acceptance of Article I courts, and the "virtually unthinkable" return to
a literal interpretation of Article III,229 the distinction between Article I and Article
III courts must have some constitutional significance. In recent years, gauging the
extent to which these features have been assigned to Article I courts has been a
significant factor in distinguishing bankruptcy from other non-Article III courts. 23 0
225 Id. (citation omitted).
226 Id. (highlighting Framers intent to ensure independence of Judiciary from Congress and Executive).
227 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828) (differentiating legislative courts "created in virtue of
the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government" from constitutional courts "in which the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited").
228 Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision,
1983 DuKE L.J. 197, 198-99 (1983) (suggesting Supreme Court precedent holds legislative courts incapable
of exercising "judicial power" despite similarity to cases adjudicated by Article III courts).
229 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 915, 916-17 (1988) (discussing Court's rejection of "view that all federal adjudicative tribunals must
be article III courts").
230 Marshall, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 (contrasting bankruptcy courts with agency adjudication over
particularized matters).
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And it is difficult to imagine a broader delegation of apparent judicial power to
Article I courts than that found in the Code.
Moreover, this distinction cannot be glossed over by careful legislative framing
of the substantive rights swept into the bankruptcy process. Marathon suggested a
distinction between the legislative power to create federal rights and the power to
relabel rights into an Article I scheme in manner that renders Article III protection
meaningless. Granfinanciera further clarifies that the mere repackaging of existing
private rights does not transform them into public rights, and Marshall confirms
that bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to enter final judgment with
respect to these matters. Even fraudulent transfer litigation, the centerpiece the first
modern bankruptcy law,2 3 1 falls prey to this exclusion from bankruptcy court
authority under Marshall.232 And though the Bankruptcy Code may be said to create
certain rights233 as part of the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, much of the
business of bankruptcy courts centers on the initial determination of matters that are
commonly perceived as private.
Barring the Court's unlikely abandonment of the public/private right dichotomy
in the bankruptcy context or a more definitive statement of what constitutes a public
right in bankruptcy, we are left with a framework that tells us only that specific
delegations of authority are or are not permissible. Thus, even if the question
resolved in Marshall is a "narrow one" and will not significantly change the
division of responsibility among bankruptcy and district courts,234 the Court's
collective jurisprudence in this area-Marathon, Granfinanciera and now
Marshall-carries potentially sweeping implications for the constitutional status of
the modern bankruptcy system. This ambiguity concerning a critical feature of the
modern bankruptcy structure invites further strategic, piecemeal litigation and
ensures that a cloud of uncertainty will hang over bankruptcy practice until it is
finally resolved.
B. The Public Right Exception in Bankruptcy?
1. Created and Existing Rights
Although expansive interpretations of Marshall, Granfinanciera and Marathon
would effectively foreclose bankruptcy court adjudication over virtually any dispute
231 See Statute of 13 Eliz., ch 5 (1571) (codifying transactions intended to defraud creditors as void).
232 See In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 325 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) ("[W]hen combined
with Granfinanciera, at the very least suggests that a bankruptcy court's entry of a money judgment in
connection with an avoided fraudulent transfer is constitutionally suspect."); see also Sitka Enters. v.
Segarra-Miranda, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90243, 7-8 (D.P.R. 2011) (concluding that Marshall precludes
adjudication of fraudulent conveyance actions in bankruptcy court). But see In re Innovative Commuc'n
Corp., BR 07-30012, 2011 WL 3439291 at *3 (Bankr. D.V.I. August 5, 2011) (concluding that fraudulent
conveyance actions are core matters subject to bankruptcy court adjudication or, in the alternative, that the
district court could merely accept the court's order as a "Report and Recommendation" if it disagreed).
233 See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing rights created by Code).
234 Marshall, 131 5. Ct. at 2620 (agreeing with United States that question presented is narrow).
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involving private rights, including many core matters, the Court appears reluctant to
embrace such a sweeping conclusion. While many rights that might be framed as
"created" in bankruptcy are premised on or qualified by pre-existing non-
bankruptcy rights, this reluctance suggests that incorporation may be less offensive
to separation of powers than the relabeling criticized in Granfinanciera.23 5 Thus,
rights that are incorporated into the framework for evaluating legislatively created
rights may be decided by the Article I court, 23 6 but only to the extent necessary to
reach a determination on the created right. 2 37 Adjudication of matters that are
merely related to these created or incorporated rights in bankruptcy court may be
expedient, but nonconsensual delegation of these matters is not consistent with
Article III regardless of whether they are designated as core.
In sum, Marshall may be read to continue the Court's effort to distinguish
between rights that are (a) created by the legislative scheme to restructure debtor-
creditor relations; (b) necessarily incorporated as part of the substantive design of
that scheme; and (c) private matters, regardless of whether they are relabeled under
the Code. For example, a debtor's right to the automatic stay during the pendency
of a case and a discharge thereafter appear to fall in the first category because they
are creations of bankruptcy law that are central to the restructuring scheme. 2 38 The
claim allowance mechanisms for restructuring debtor-creditor relations upon the
debtor's bankruptcy supplant existing recovery rights with new bankruptcy-specific
rights that are largely premised upon pre-bankruptcy rights, which may be reviewed
to the extent necessary to determine a creditor's distribution rights under the
235 Indeed, this has been a common reading of Marshall in the relatively short time since the opinion was
handed down. See, e.g., In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., 457 B.R. 314, 320 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (concluding
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear adversary proceeding as it directly stems from bankruptcy case);
see also In re Salander O'Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Nowhere in
Marathon, Granfinanciera, or Stern does the Supreme Court rule that the bankruptcy court may not rule
with respect to state law when determining a proof of claim in the bankruptcy, or when deciding a matter
directly and conclusively related to the bankruptcy. As noted, Stern repeatedly emphasizes that it addresses
only the constitutionality of the bankruptcy court making a final ruling on a state-law counterclaim that
would not be finally resolved in the process of allowing or disallowing a proof of claim. The Granfinanciera
Court interpreted previous cases as holding that the creditor's right to a jury trial turned on whether it
submitted a claim against the estate. The Marathon plurality emphasized the difference between
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations and enforcement of a purely private right. The thread that binds
these cases is the concept that when the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is at issue, the adjudication of a
proof of claim-a request for payment from the estate-is of paramount concern.") (internal citations
omitted).
236 See In re Soo Bin Kim, No. 10-54472, 2011 WL 2708985, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 11, 2011)
(stating need to reach determinations that may be preclusive in subsequent state court proceedings does not
preclude bankruptcy court from doing so in order to decide core bankruptcy matters).
237 See JustMed, Inc. v. Byce (In re Byce), No. 11-00378, 2011 WL 6210938, at *3 (D. Idaho Dec. 14,
2011) ("[I]t was not the mere presence of state law issues that drove the Stem decision; it was that the state-
law claim had no other connection to the bankruptcy matter and would not be resolved in the claims
allowance process.").
238 See In re Turner, 462 B.R. 214, 221 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (showing both debtors and creditors
benefit from automatic stay). Similarly, dismissal of a bankruptcy case falls squarely within the bankruptcy
court's authority following Marshall. See Mahanna v. Bynum, No. A-i11-CA-815-SS, 2011 WL 5974366, at
*4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2011).
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Code.2 3 9 On the other hand, Marshall reaffirms that Congress lacks authority to
sweep private rights litigation into bankruptcy court merely because it may lead to
more efficient administration of a case. 24 0
2. The Restructuring of Debtor-Creditor Relations Focus
The Court's jurisprudence in this area may be easier to distinguish from other
areas of law if we view the plurality and majority opinions as embracing a narrower
conception of the bankruptcy power to regulate debtor-creditor relations, at least
through a non-Article III rights adjudication framework, than has been widely
assumed. At one point, the Marshall court suggested that claims brought "to
augment the estate" must be characterized as a matter of private right, while
"creditors' hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res"
might be considered public right matters. 24' If the bankruptcy power to create or
incorporate private rights is limited to the restructuring of the debtor's relations with
its creditors (as opposed to the restructuring of the debtor's relations with its
creditors and debtors), then the Bankruptcy Clause authorizes exclusive
determination over only these matters to the other branches. The inclusion of other
private matters-such as the contract, tort and fraudulent transfer actions against the
estates' debtors in Marathon, Marshall, and Granfinanciera-into the legislative
scheme may be an appropriate exercise of legislative authority, but only to the
239 See supra Section II.B.2. Likewise, the bankruptcy court has authority to approve or reject the trustee's
settlement of a non-bankruptcy dispute because the act of settlement is at the heart of the review; it is not a
final determination of the merits of the matters being settled. In re Washington Mut., Inc., 461 BR. 200, 214
(Bankr. D. Del. 2011). The determination of whether property qualifies as "property of the estate" falls
within the bankruptcy court's authority for much the same reason. Id.; see also Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Panda Energy Int'l, Inc. (In re Hereford Biofuels, L.P.), No. 10-03341, 2012 WL 10298, at *2 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. Jan. 3, 2012) (providing post-confirmation interpretation of bankruptcy asset sale order and
determination of what qualified as "property of the estate" under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code
remains subject to final adjudication in bankruptcy court); In re Hill, No. 08-36267, 2011 WL 6936357, at
*7 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2011) (determining whether property is exempt or property of the estate "is
central to the public bankruptcy scheme, as it relates to both the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over the
debtor's property (because before property can become exempt, it is property of the estate) and the equitable
distribution of that property among a debtor's creditors"); In re Blakely, No. 11-13674, 2011 WL 4458830,
at *2 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2011).
240 Marshall, 131 S. Ct. at 2619 ("It goes without saying that 'the fact that a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it
is contrary to the Constitution."' (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983))). To that end, even
though it may be more efficient for a bankruptcy court to hear and determine a state law cause of action
premised on conduct in the bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court may lack Constitutional authority
to do so. See Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26009 (7th Cir. Dec. 30, 2011)
(holding bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter final judgment concerning proof of claim forms that
allegedly violated Wisconsin medical record disclosure law).
241 Id. at 2614 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989)). Thus, as Judge
Schmetterer properly noted, "Stern left intact the authority of a bankruptcy judge to fully adjudge a creditor's
claim." Dragisic v. Boricich (In re Boricich), No. 08 B 15248, 2011 WL 5579062, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Nov. 15, 2011).
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extent that it is related to the restructuring of the debtor's relations with its creditors
and does not withdraw these ancillary matters from Article III courts.
As discussed previously, historical practice may support this narrower view of
the bankruptcy power. Although bankruptcy liquidation necessarily involves the
ability to marshal the bankrupt's res for distribution to its creditors, the bankruptcy
power does not require any legislative alteration of the bankrupt's substantive state
law rights against its own debtors.242 Rather, bankruptcy laws have primarily
charged one or more individuals with the power and responsibility of marshaling
the bankrupt's assets and, if necessary, pursuing litigation in the place of the debtor
in an appropriate state or Article III federal court. Such a limitation likewise
addresses the federalism concerns that are implicated by bankruptcy law. 243
To be clear, this characterization is illustrative of the limits of Congress' power
to frame the structural mechanisms for administering bankruptcy cases under
Article III; not a definitive characterization of the actual limits of Congress'
substantive authority over bankruptcy under Article I.244 Notwithstanding the
occasional early American bankruptcy law that granted some modest additional
judicial power to quasi-judicial officers, none of these forays occurred within a
structure with the collective breadth and depth of the modern bankruptcy system.
Thus, even if an isolated expansion of judicial power may survive scrutiny under a
traditional bankruptcy administration structure, it will be viewed as part of the
whole modern bankruptcy structure, which exercises a degree of judicial power that
is largely indistinguishable from that reserved to Article III judges under the
Constitution. Put simply, when these provisions are reviewed in the context of the
bankruptcy court structure as a whole, there are not enough other limitations on
bankruptcy courts' judicial power to avoid separation of powers concerns.
Accordingly, this suggests that only those structural elements that fall within the
basic traditional bankruptcy framework are likely to survive Article III scrutiny.
C. The Limits of Consent
1. The Proof of Claim as Consent
The most obvious impact of Marshall is the demise of the theory that a
creditor's pursuit of payment on a discrete claim qualifies as consent to Article I
adjudication of any and all disputes between the parties. Filing a proof of claim
242 Marshall, 131 S. Ct. at 2616 (quoting Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549
U.S. 443, 451 (2007)).
243 See Cole, supra note 25, at 241 ("By deferring to nonbankruptcy substantive law, bankruptcy preserves
both the vertical and horizontal separation of powers that currently characterizes such law, and promotes the
jurisdictional competition that flows from the horizontal separation of sovereigns. Bankruptcy, then, can be
viewed as federalist to the extent that its rules are merely procedural and directed at solving the problem of
the common pool.").
244 For a discussion of the case for limiting the substantive power of Congress under the Bankruptcy
Clause in this way, see Thomas B. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487,
490-92 (1996).
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qualifies as consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of the underlying non-
bankruptcy rights because this adjudication is necessary to determine whether a
claim should be allowed and its relative priority. Fraudulent transfers are private
matters in the absence of a proof of claim, but they are necessarily incorporated
after a proof of claim is filed because 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) reflects a clear substantive
prohibition on allowing claims that are held by those who are the recipients of
fraudulent or preferential transfers.
Even under this limited interpretation of the majority's holding, the dissent
suggested that the impact on bankruptcy administration would be far greater than
the majority predicted.245 Although filing a proof of claim may qualify as consent to
jurisdiction over counterclaims that may be fully resolved without inquiry beyond
that required by the claim allowance process, many counterclaims require
consideration of additional facts and law. 24 6 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent,
the resulting "constitutionally required game of jurisdictional ping-pong between
courts" raises the specter of "inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless
additional suffering among those faced with bankruptcy." 247
Although the ruling may have implications for the expeditious administration of
bankruptcy cases, it is not entirely clear that the long-term result will be as dire as
anticipated by the dissent, at least for the reasons given. As the majority noted, "the
framework Congress adopted in the 1984 Act already contemplates that certain state
law matters in bankruptcy cases will be resolved by judges other than those of the
bankruptcy courts." 24 8 With respect to these matters, bankruptcy courts frequently
defer to the appropriate state courts or enter proposed findings of facts and
conclusions of law with the final decision rendered by the district court. 24 9
245 Marshall, 131 S. Ct. at 2629-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (hypothesizing burdensome change in authority
able to hear counterclaim).
246 For example, Justice Breyer's dissent notes the situation in which a tenant files for bankruptcy, the
landlord files a claim for unpaid rent, and the tenant raises a variety of counterclaims for damages arising
from the landlord's pre-petition conduct. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
247 Id. at 2630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248 Id. at 2619.
249 See id. at 2620 (highlighting statutes allowing bankruptcy court discretion to review matters with
resolutions under applicable state law); see also In re Redondo Constr. Corp., No. 02-02887, 2006 WL
3909926, at *3 (Bankr. D.P.R. Mar. 20, 2006) (reserving district court's de novo review of bankruptcy
court's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law). The bankruptcy courts' authority to oversee pretrial
matters and otherwise hear the case without entering a final order does not appear to be implicated by
Marshall. See Kelley v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 11-194, 2011 WL 4403289, at *5-6 (D. Minn. Sept.
21, 2011). Moreover, in cases where "unconstitutional core" matters might perversely be read to fall entirely
outside the bankruptcy courts' authority to not only determine but also hear them due to the statutory
language, the emerging majority view is to read Stern to default treating the claims as if they were non-core.
See, e.g., RES-GA Four LLC v. Avalon Builders of GA LLC, No. 5:10-CV-463, 2012 WL 13544, at *7-9
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2012); Southern Elec. Coil, LLC v. First Merit Bank, N.A., No 11 C 6135, 2011 WL
6318963, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2011); JustMed, Inc. v. Byce (In re Byce), No. 1-11-CV-00378, 2011
WL 6210938, at *2-5 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2011); Reed v. Linehan (In re Soporex, Inc.), No. 11-3306. 2011
WL 5911674, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2011); McCarthy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re El-
Atari), No. 1:1lcv1O90, 2011 WL 5828013, at *2-5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2011); Field v. Lindell (In re
Mortgage Store, Inc.), No. 11-00439, 2011 WL 5056990, at *2-3 (D. Haw. Oct. 5, 2011); Paloian v. Am.
Express Co. (In re Canopy Fin., Inc.), No. 11 C5360, 2011 WL 3911082, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011);;.
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Moreover, the broader consent by ambush approach was not accepted universally
prior to Marshall, although courts generally agreed that bankruptcy courts could not
adjudicate private matters against parties who did not file a proof of claim. 250
Indeed, the petitioner did not attempt to defend universal consent; instead, he
suggested that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C)'s reach should be limited to compulsory
counterclaims. 251
The net impact on bankruptcy administration may be difficult to predict for
another reason: parties that might have had viable claims against debtors' estates
have, at times, elected against filing a proof of claim to avoid bankruptcy court
252
adjudication of other, more important disputes among the parties.2 Indeed, a
common practitioner question concerning the Marshall case is why Pierce filed the
proof of claim given the limited likelihood of collection and the risk that the
bankruptcy court would assert jurisdiction over all of the related disputes. 2 53 The
degree to which potential claims have not been filed is difficult to quantify, but it
highlights the fact that strategic avoidance of bankruptcy court adjudication would
occur even under the dissent's approach.
Finally, as a matter of policy, it is not clear that shoehorning all related disputes,
or even the narrower group of all compulsory counterclaims, into a single,
streamlined Article I bankruptcy forum is desirable across the universe of actions
that would be implicated. Bankruptcy policy analysis is frequently premised on the
assumptions that such matters are primarily pecuniary and that creditors and debtors
tend to be haves and have-nots, respectively. If we begin from these starting points,
then it may be easy to rationalize the idea of sweeping all actions into the debtor's
bankruptcy forum of choice as doing little more than leveling the playing field to
expedite case administration. These generalizations, however, do not hold true
across bankruptcy cases and proceedings. Few would characterize the mega-
bankruptcy debtors of the last decade as being at the mercy of their mom-and-pop
vendors and individual customers in the absence of this power. Likewise, although
damages are pecuniary by definition, the rights vindicated in tort and civil rights
cases are difficult to characterize as primarily financial. Indeed, the National Board
of Trial Advocates and the National Black Chamber of Commerce filed a bipartisan
250 See, e.g., Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095,
1102 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding breach of contract action against party that did not file a proof of claim was
non-core); Bank of LaFayette v. Baudoin (In re Baudoin), 981 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding tort
and contract claims against secured lender qualified as core because the lender filed a proof of claim); In re
Depo, 40 B.R. 537, 542 (N.D.N.Y 1984) ("[A] review of the cases and authorities indicates that, while the
matter is not uniformly settled, the filing of a proof of claim is generally considered to constitute implied
consent to Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction over at least any compulsory counterclaims asserted by the
trustee.").
251 See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 193, at 50-64 (arguing bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims as Constitutional under Thomas/Schor analysis and Crowell adjunct-court
theory).
252 See In re Charter Commc'ns, 409 B.R. 649, 652 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting party's "strategic"
decision not to file proof of claim).
253 Although purely anecdotal, this question has been among the first to come up in every discussion that I
have had with practicing bankruptcy lawyers concerning the Marshall case since 2009.
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amicus brief in Marshall, in which they questioned the quality of justice such cases
would receive before Article I bankruptcy courts. 25 4
2. Broader Implications
Beyond the proof of claim as consent question, it may be tempting to read
Marshall as having far broader implications for consent in bankruptcy generally;
suggesting substantial potential litigation over what, exactly, suffices when consent
is the only apparent basis for judicial authority. Even if all parties appear to consent
to Article I adjudication, litigants may subsequently argue that they did not, in fact,
consent. This uncertainty may provide litigants with an opportunity to take a
second bite at the apple if they are unhappy with the result in bankruptcy court. As
Judge Gerber reasoned following Marshall:
[I]t may now be, and it's fair to assume that it will now be argued,
that consent, no matter how uncoerced and unequivocal, will never
again be sufficient for bankruptcy judges ever to issue final
judgments on non-core matters. That huge uncertainty presages
litigation over that issue with the potential to tie up this case, and
countless others, in knots. It also would at least seemingly invite
litigants to consent, see how they like the outcome, and then, if they
lose, say their consents were invalid.2 55
Given the circumstances in which these comments were made-the court's
authority to require non-core claims against the reorganized debtor's current and
former officers and directors be filed in the bankruptcy court 2 56 -courts facing less
expansive assertions of authority may not be inclined to follow Judge Gerber's lead.
For example, in a tax dispute related to the IndyMac receivership, the district court
rejected a motion to withdraw the reference notwithstanding the conclusion that the
matter was a noncore "dispute between private parties." 2 57 There, the district court
254 See Brief for the National Black Chamber of Commerce and the American Board of Trial Advocates as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, 10-179 (Dec. 20, 2010), available at:
http://www.abota.org/docDownload/45776.
255 In re BearingPoint, Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
256 See id. at 492 (stating bankruptcy court has no authority to enter final judgment on non-core matters).
As the court further explained:
this action will be tied in procedural knots by motion practice, here and in the District
Court, exploiting asserted or actual inabilities on my part, as an Article I bankruptcy
judge, to issue findings and orders. Here, I fear, the additional litigation resulting from
my inability to fully rule will have its own Bleak House implications, not unlike the
Bleak House litigation referred to by the Stern v. Marshall court itself.
Id. at 488.
257 See Siegel v. FDIC (In re IndyMac Bancorp Inc.), No. CV 11-03969-RGK, 2011 WL 2883012, at *6-7
(C.D. Cal. July 15, 2011).
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reasoned that leaving the initial adjudication in bankruptcy court, subject to de novo
review, would be a more efficient use of judicial resources given its "greater
familiarity with the facts" and "unique vantage point from the center of the overall
bankruptcy proceeding." 25 8
Of course, Marshall does not suggest any modification to the general rule that
parties may expressly consent to adjudication in a non-Article III forum or, for that
matter, that knowing and voluntary waivers may not be implied from a party's
conduct. Although it might be more expeditious to view the mere act of filing a
proof of claim as implying consent to wholesale adjudication of all related matters
in bankruptcy court, it does not necessarily imply that the party knowingly and,
given the absence of a viable alternative, voluntarily did so. By that same rationale,
however, commencing a case or proceeding in bankruptcy court may be properly
viewed as waiving Article III adjudication with respect to the issues that necessarily
arise as a result. Likewise, submitting a voluntary settlement of disputed matters
for approval pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019 does not appear to run contrary to
Marshall.259
To avoid any ambiguity and the procedural difficulties of the parties' uncertain
intent, at least one court has required parties that may raise Marshall to expressly
note their consent (or refusal to consent) to bankruptcy court jurisdiction. 26 0 This is
already required by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure with respect to non-
core adversary proceedings,261 even if litigants generally recycle sweeping
statements of jurisdiction and authority from one brief to the next. Of course,
unhappy litigants may later argue that any express consent was not truly voluntary
because, among other things, they feared that withholding consent would weigh
against them in core matters pending before the bankruptcy court. It is difficult to
imagine, however, that such an argument would prevail, and nothing in Marshall
suggests that specific, express consent is an insufficient basis for bankruptcy court
authority. And while this approach may not be sufficient to resolve all of the
jurisdictional complexities that may follow Marshall (particularly where a party
consents to jurisdiction over only select issues or none at all), it should effectively
deny litigants more than one bite at the apple.
258 See id. at *7. Other district courts have taken a similar approach. See McCarthy v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (In re El-Atari), No. 1:1lcv1090, 2011 WL 5828013, at *2-5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2011); City Bank v.
Compass Bank, No. EP-11-MC-372-KC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129654, at *8-10 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 9,
2011).
259 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of the City v. Ambac Fin. Group, Inc. (In re Ambac Fin. Group, Inc.), No. 10-
B-15973, 2011 WL 6844533, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2011) (discussing settlement of shareholder litigation
against debtor).
260 See In re Polaroid Corp., 451 B.R. 493, 495-96 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2011) (stating parties' consent is
required for bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment).
261 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008(a) (stating parties are required to state their consent or non-consent to
bankruptcy judge's entering of final judgment); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b) (stating lack of parties'
express consent to final judgment in non-core proceedings disallows bankruptcy judges from entering final
judgments).
220 [Vol. 20: 179
CONSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN BANKRUPTCY
D. The Shifting Risk Calculus in Bankruptcy Administration and Appeals
The confluence of unusual factors contributing to the procedural posture of the
case at each stage-and the fact that a change to any one of which may have
foreclosed or ended the litigation years earlier- suggests that it is no accident that
more than two decades passed between Granfinanciera and Marshall. Pierce could
have avoided the issue by foregoing the proof of claim, and the appeal might have
been curtailed had the bankruptcy court adopted the narrower reading of consent
embraced by some other courts or abstained from proceeding with the probate
counterclaims in light of the fact that they were simultaneously proceeding in the
Texas probate court. The district court could have withdrawn the reference early in
the case or entered a final order following a less searching de novo review prior to
the entry of the probate court's judgment. Moreover, as a practical matter, few
bankruptcy disputes involve such high stakes to justify the additional time and
expense associated with bankruptcy appeals, and even fewer also involve the degree
of personal animosity between the litigants found in Marshall.
That Marshall required such a perfect storm of events reflects the genius of the
1984 Amendments: while they did not fully resolve the constitutional questions
raised in Marathon, they effectively reduced the prospects that the remaining
questions would find their way to the Supreme Court. Although sweeping
jurisdiction over disputes remained under the amendments, district courts
effectively exercised their authority to withdraw the reference or review certain
matters de novo when challenges to bankruptcy court authority arose. Indeed, this
is precisely what happened in Marshall and would have ended the public/private
question at that stage but for the timing of the entry of the Texas probate judgment.
The flood of attention to the limits of bankruptcy court authority in Marshall's
aftermath stands in stark contrast to the frequently overlooked absence of a
constitutional foundation for the exercise of at least some of that authority prior to
Marshall. As one judge observed following Marshall, "in exercising my delegated
authority, I have entered countless orders as final without a second thought about
the legitimacy of what I was doing." 26 2 This is understandable in many cases; 28
U.S.C. § 157(b), which was crafted expressly to address Marathon, created a fairly
straightforward division of authority between bankruptcy and district courts. 263
Even expansive conceptions of consent drew support from long-standing precedent
and practice. And if the issue was not raised early in the proceedings, it typically
fell by the wayside while the substantive issues were resolved.
Much of this attention focuses less on what Marshall says than on the numerous
questions that it and its predecessors leave unresolved. The mere fact that the
core/non-core dichotomy does not precisely mirror the public/private dichotomy
262 In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. 318, 321 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
263 Id. at 320-21 (stating previously clear constitutional division of powers between bankruptcy judges and
district court judges).
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can hardly be called surprising, 264 but the Court's decision establishes that mere core
status will be insufficient to establish constitutional authority without providing an
alternative framework for guidance. As Judge Hughes noted,
My frustration with Stern is that it offers virtually no insight as to
how to recalibrate the core/non-core dichotomy so that I can again
proceed with at least some assurance that I will not be making the
same constitutional blunder with respect to some other aspect of ...
Section 157(b)(2). 2 65
And as previously noted, Marshall's silence "as to how much further this
constitutional protection extends into the bankruptcy process" also leaves open the
possibility that issues central to the restructuring of a debtor's relations with its
creditors are not subject to the public rights exception, if the exception even applies
266in the bankruptcy setting. Even if such an exception can be found, either along
the lines discussed previously or otherwise, "this is not a situation where those who
labor in the fields can wait until the next fistfight between an expectant heir and his
stepmom finds its way to the Court." 2 67
The immediate post-Marshall surge of litigation2 68 suggests that the case has
effectively brought the relative lull in litigation over public and private rights to an
abrupt end. The breadth and depth of the structural constitutional gap may have
been concealed by uncertainty and the risks and costs associated with litigation, but
the Court's express rejection of core status as sufficient has clearly emboldened
parties to bring these issues front and center. We may expect more claims to be
filed and difficult questions concerning the degree to which related matters may be
adjudicated in bankruptcy court to consume already stretched judicial resources.
Indeed, given the fact that some justices appear reluctant to accept any conception
of a public right in bankruptcy,269 we may expect some dissatisfied litigants to press
challenges to bankruptcy court adjudication of even matters limited to the
restructuring of a debtor's relations with its creditors to the Supreme Court.
That said, it is not entirely clear that this increase will yield definitive answers.
Although we may expect a flurry of battles over these issues in the future, the
institutional mechanisms for resolving them early in the litigation (withdrawal of
the reference or remand to state court) or glossing over them on review (for
example, by styling an appeal as de novo consideration of a report and
recommendation) should continue to be effective in all but the most extreme cases
(such as Marshall). This dual result-more challenges at the early stages but
264 Id at 323 (highlighting confusion between core/non-core and public/private dichotomies).
265 Id
266 Id (indicating judicial confusion of extent of public right exception).
267 Id
268 See, e.g., In re Blixseth, No. 90-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *10-11 (Bankr. D. Mont., Aug. 1,
2011) (discussing post-Marshall constitutionality of core jurisdiction for bankruptcy courts).
269 TeleServiCeS, 456 B.R. at 323 (showing reluctance to accept "public rights" exception as given).
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limited prospects for seeing the many questions that remain addressed by the higher
courts-may be the worst possible outcome for the long-term efficiency of the
bankruptcy process.
III. FILLING THE STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL GAP AFTER STERN V. Al4RSHALL
After Marshall, we are once again left to ask where we go from here. The most
obvious response to Marshall is a return to the original structural design of the
legislation that ultimately became the Bankruptcy Code: the establishment of
Article III bankruptcy courts. Although this proposal was ultimately rejected and
has been discussed frequently over the years,270 the temporal constitutional gap
made possible by the 1984 Amendments appears to have altered some of the key
assumptions about bankruptcy judges and practice that guided much of the early
debate. To that end, this section begins with an assessment of these basic
arguments (and some new ones) in light of the bankruptcy system that has evolved
during the last three decades. Barring the adoption of the Article III proposal, this
section also suggests a modest structural change to the Bankruptcy Code and Title
28 of the U.S. Code that may alleviate the chaos anticipated in some circles
following Marshall. Finally, this section suggests that courts should adopt a narrow
reading of Marshall, as suggested by the majority, to improve the long-term
efficiency of the bankruptcy process.
A. Article III Bankruptcy Courts
1. The Policy Arguments for Article III Status
One of the central objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and its predecessors has
been to make the restructuring of a bankrupt's relations with its creditors as efficient
as possible. 27 1 A common and persistent criticism of the various federal bankruptcy
laws has been the degree to which the costs and delays associated bankruptcy strip
272
creditors of their rightful recoveries. And perhaps no other aspect of the 1898 Act
embodied this criticism so much as the summary/plenary division of authority
between referees and district court judges, which generated much of the waste and
delay that plagued bankruptcy cases under the Act.273 Thus, a key component of
270 See supra notes 14-16.
271 See Block-Lieb, supra note 16, at 541 (highlighting main objective of Code is efficient resolution of
bankruptcy cases).
272 See S. Todd Brown, Non-Pecuniary Interests and the Injudicious Limits of Appellate Standing in
Bankruptcy, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 569, 585-86 (2007) (noting bias and that strict adherence to bankruptcy
laws is often sacrificed to avoid delay).
273 See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 16, at 532 ("The division of summary and plenary jurisdiction over
bankruptcy matters was severely criticized because, in some cases, litigants were able to dispute the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction for years before any court ever reached the merits of the suit. This undesirable
jurisdictional litigation and the attendant cost and delay to the participants was a major factor in the drafting
of the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.").
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achieving this objective in the original Code was the centralization of substantially
all relevant matters in a single forum-the bankruptcy court-with broad authority
to enter final orders promptly.
The curious series of events that stripped Article III status from the original
Code and preserved the strained Article I structure through the 1984 Amendments
have largely undermined this objective. The structure initially invited constitutional
challenge and delay, and, in addition to dividing final adjudicative authority
according to core or non-core status generally, the 1984 Amendments made
resolution of certain of the most difficult claims exceedingly complex and time-
consuming.274 As one author noted more than a decade ago:
Every time courts narrowly construe the scope of the core
proceedings over which bankruptcy courts are authorized by statute
to exercise jurisdiction, every time they limit the judicial functions
of bankruptcy courts, and every time they broadly construe the
withdrawal, abstention and remand provisions, they create
opportunities for delaying the administration of a bankruptcy case.
And, every time courts broadly construe the authority of
bankruptcy courts to hear and determine litigation that arises in a
bankruptcy context and every time they expand upon their judicial
functions or narrowly confine the powers of a district court to
withdraw the reference of a proceeding, they instead raise the
specter of unconstitutionality over the determination - a specter
which hangs, like the sword of Damocles, until resolved with
finality by the Supreme Court of the United States.275
As noted previously, these obstacles to efficiency appear all the more likely to
plague bankruptcy practice going forward following Marshall.
Beyond administrative efficiency, the public/private dichotomy yields the
perverse result of precluding bankruptcy courts from entering final orders on
matters that fall well within their expertise in favor of Article III generalists. For
example, fraudulent transfers, complex contract disputes (particularly those that
hinge upon timing questions) and many questions concerning secured status under
non-bankruptcy law are far more common in bankruptcy than in other forums, and
bankruptcy courts and practitioners have developed considerable expertise in the
murky outer fringes of these areas of law. Even if we were to accept the
assumption that bankruptcy judges are less capable than their Article III
counterparts generally,2 76 this familiarity should suggest that bankruptcy courts are
274 Id at 542-44 (noting fractionalization of bankruptcy jurisdiction pursuant to 1984 Amendments causes
delay, which contradicts bankruptcy policy favoring expedition).
275 Id at 544-45.
276 As discussed infra Section III.A.4, this assumption ignores the qualifications and experience of modern
bankruptcy judges even with respect to matters that fall outside of the core of bankruptcy practice.
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at least as sophisticated in these areas as judges who must squeeze them into court
calendars between criminal trials, disputes over various government programs and
Title VII litigation.
In sum, if the Code is to realize the potential of its original structural design,
bankruptcy judges should be appointed pursuant to Article 111.277 In one fell swoop,
this adjustment to the bankruptcy structure will resolve the unnecessarily
cumbersome questions associated with dividing initial adjudication among
bankruptcy and district courts, the higher costs and confusion associated with the
additional layer of bankruptcy appeals, and the time and expense associated with
bringing district courts up to speed on the facts and law that are already familiar to
bankruptcy judges.
2. The Policy Argument for Division of Authority
Although the case for Article III status is obvious and compelling on efficiency
grounds, many involuntary participants in bankruptcy understandably prefer to
preserve their ability to vindicate their rights in another forum. Of course, some
creditors and others may relish the ability to exploit this potential for strategic
advantage in negotiations, but those who are convinced that the bankruptcy forum is
stacked against them are not entirely off base. 27 8 Everything that happens in
bankruptcy takes place in the shadow of the bankruptcy case, and a thumb on the
scale in favor of moving case forward may always be present where a court is
responsible for all proceedings related to a case, even if it undermines individual
rights. For example, assume that the court is confronted with a question concerning
unsettled state law. A judgment in favor of debtor will move the case toward
finality, while the court is told that judgment in favor of non-debtor takes plan
negotiations back to the drawing board, if not dooms the case. 2 79 If the non-debtor's
claim is sufficiently small, she lacks sufficient resources to appeal or is unlikely to
have standing to appeal, the court can effectively end the dispute and advance the
case toward conclusion with a judgment in favor of the debtor. Even if an appeal
seems likely, a judgment in favor of the debtor may be viewed as providing the
estate with leverage that may bring a recalcitrant non-debtor to the table. In sum,
277 Jeffrey T. Ferriell, The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeshi Act of
1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 197 (1989) (concluding that affording bankruptcy courts Article III status is
the "only rational solution" to constitutional questions arising from bankruptcy court structure); Jonathan L.
Flaxer, Bankruptcy Court Power to Adjudicate Contract Disputes, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 369, 399
(1994) ("[U]ltimately these problems and inefficiencies will continue until Congress does what it should
have done in 1978 and 1984, which is to create an Article III bankruptcy court.").
278 As Cole and Zywicki noted in discussing the Marshall case, "the incentive structure associated with
Article I might dramatically affect the outcome of a dispute rooted in state law." Cole & Zywicki, supra note
80, at 540.
279 Even if the debtor and other parties are willing and able to make the concessions necessary to move
forward in the event of an unfavorable judgment, they tend to argue that an unfavorable outcome will be the
bankruptcy equivalent of Armageddon. For an example of this from practice, see Brown, supra note 13, at
912 n.190.
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what passes for the quirky unpredictability of bankruptcy can be readily understood
by appreciating the degree to which bankruptcy courts seek efficient and timely
resolution of a case and the manner in which they may employ their judicial role to
achieve it.
Article III status does not resolve this "thumb on the scales of justice" 280
concern. Nothing in the Article III confirmation process removes or ensures that a
judge is immune to the interpretive and perceptive biases that plague people
generally, and it is not at all clear how life tenure would alter the institutional
pressure to encourage parties to move toward resolution of a bankruptcy case or
proceeding. If these parties who seek non-bankruptcy resolution of private matters
are correct in assuming that the cards are stacked against them in the bankruptcy
forum, Article III status will merely gloss over the degree to which they are denied
impartial adjudication of their rights. Even if these concerns are overblown, Article
III status will do little to preserve the appearance of impartiality that is critical to the
perceived legitimacy of the judicial process.
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the special interests that have consistently and
successfully lobbied to reduce bankruptcy courts' discretion281 would sit idly by as
Article III bankruptcy courts assumed final authority over the universe of matters
related to a bankruptcy case. Although these amendments have largely targeted the
interstitial discretion afforded bankruptcy judges over core bankruptcy matters, the
implicit distrust of bankruptcy judges' capacity for objectivity and fairness-
regardless of whether this distrust is justified-suggests that any effort to expand
their direct control over related matters would meet substantial political resistance.
To that end, while Marshall clearly suggests Article III status is the most sensible
solution to the constitutional issues that plague the modern framework, it remains
politically unlikely barring a more direct and urgent threat to the viability of the
bankruptcy system.
3. Comparative Efficiency of the Article III Appointment Process
Although Article III status may ultimately promise greater efficiency in theory,
the practical short- and long-term realities of Article III appointments suggest that
the political process will undermine at least some this efficiency. In the short-term,
it is difficult to imagine a sudden wave of Article III judicial appointments unless
the sitting President's party also has a sufficient majority in the Senate to overcome
280 Contra 1997 NBRC Report, supra note 14, at 724 (highlighting Article III status will "promote the goal
of achieving a high quality judicial system" since critics of current system argue bankruptcy judges are
biased towards debtors).
281 See J. Maxwell Tucker, Substantive Consolidation: The Cacophony Continues, 18 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REv. 89, 144 (2010); see also Brown, supra note 272, at 586 ("And, politics aside, the bankruptcy courts'
perceived bias toward reorganization and expediency played a significant part in the decision to roll back
judicial discretion in the 2005 Amendments."); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense:
Representing Consumers Under the "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,"
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 192-93 (2005).
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a filibuster. Indeed, among Democrats, the specter of Ronald Reagan making
hundreds of new lifetime Article III bankruptcy judge appointments was a
compelling argument against creating Article III bankruptcy courts during the
debates concerning the 1984 Amendments. 2 82
To address this concern, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's 1997
report proposed allowing current bankruptcy judges to finish their 14-year terms
and replace them with Article III appointments as they retired. 283 During this
transition period, jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters would transfer from district
courts to the new Article III bankruptcy courts as they were appointed, and these
new Article III courts would retain the power to refer bankruptcy matters to existing
Article I judges until, ultimately, all of the Article I judges are replaced through
attrition. 284
Even if the NBRC transition proposal resolves the wholesale appointment
objection without raising equally daunting problems of its own, the Article III
confirmation process carries considerable baggage. If anything, this process has
become more bitterly divided in the years since the 1984 Amendments, 2 8 5 which
raises the troubling prospect of an increasing number of vacant bankruptcy
judgeships far beyond that seen under the current system. Today, bankruptcy
vacancies are most often announced, applications evaluated, candidates interviewed
and appointments made in advance of the retirement of sitting judges. 286 By
contrast, Article III seats may remain unfilled for years while the President and
Senate perform the confirmation dance. 28 And though senior Article III judges may
still preside over discrete matters in other situations, it is unclear whether senior
bankruptcy judges would continue to oversee a sufficient number of bankruptcy
cases to make up the slack. This could be particularly problematic in the short term
if 28 U.S.C. § 155(b), which provides for the recall of Article I bankruptcy judges
to manage case overflow, is not left intact.
282 130 CONG. REC. 6246 (1984) (statement of Rep. Crockett, Jr.) (objecting to restructuring the
bankruptcy court system and appointing of hundreds of new Article III judges).
283 See 1997 NBRC Report, supra note 14, at 35-36 (proposing transition to an Article III bankruptcy
court).
284 See id. (discussing replacing Article I judges as vacancies are created by attrition or other means).
285 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despise and
Resent" With "Advice and Consent", 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 10 (2001) (discussing delays in Article III
appointments); Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 667, 679 (2003)
("The Senate confirmed 93% of President Reagan's first-year judicial nominations in 1981. In contrast, the
Senate confirmed 44% of President George W. Bush's nominations in 2001. Additionally, the Senate took
longer to confirm judges (an average of 112 days) in the first year of President George W. Bush's
administration than it had taken during comparable periods of earlier administrations, with the exception of
the first year of President Clinton's second term (an average of 133 days"); Brian C. Kalt, Politics and the
Federal Appointments Process, HARV. L & POL. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2011),
http://hlpronline.com/2011/04/politics-and-the-federal-appointments-process/ (positing presidential
appointment and Senate confirmation process will remain dysfunctional unless there is better, more
aggressive dialogue).;
286 See McKenzie, supra note 16, at 794 (discussing process of filling vacancy in bankruptcy judgeship).
287 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling Federal Appellate Vacancies, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 829, 829 (2009) ("Many
judgeships remain empty for long periods, while one position has been vacant since 1994.").
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It may be hoped that the confirmation of specialized bankruptcy judges will be
less politicized and more efficient than it is for the generalists that fill district and
circuit courts, but there is little reason for optimism. Indeed, in those jurisdictions
where bankruptcy cases may have profound consequences on the economy or other
social implications, we may expect the same special interests that have obtained
sufficient congressional support to fundamentally alter the balancing of interests
struck in the original Code to play a similar role in blocking the appointment of
those nominees who do not share their ideological preferences. The irony in this
may be that those jurisdictions that require a full slate of bankruptcy judges to
handle their extensive caseloads may also be the jurisdictions where prompt
appointments are most difficult to achieve.
In this sense, the Delaware experience in the early part of the last decade is
instructive. Beginning in the early 1990's, Delaware rose to prominence as the
preferred venue for many of the largest bankruptcy filings in the country.288
Unfortunately, the court had just two sitting judges, and Congress repeatedly
ignored pleas to expand the number of authorized bankruptcy judges in the
district.28 9 By the time Congress expanded the number of judges in Delaware in
2005, Delaware had lost much of its luster, in large part due to questions about its
relative capacity to handle the number of cases filed efficiently. 2 90
This experience demonstrates that the current process is far from immune to
congressional inaction on critical matters of bankruptcy court administration, but it
also highlights the degree to which individual courts may be (or at least be
perceived) as far less efficient when there are few sitting judges to manage the
volume of cases filed. This sort of problem can only become more pronounced
when the other branches are responsible not only for fixing the number of judges
within a district but also the regular appointment and confirmation of these judges.
288 Harvey R. Miller, Chapter11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1987,
1987 (2002) (noting migration of chapter 11 cases from other venues to Delaware during the 1990's).
289 Id. at 1994 (stating chapter 11 cases in Delware could be assigned to one of two judges until 1997).
Delaware was afforded a second bankruptcy judge in 1993. James L. Patton Jr. et al., A Modern History of
Bankruptcy in Delaware, 24 DEL. LAw. 12, 14 (Winter 2006/2007). Congress later added four additional
bankruptcy judges to Delaware in the 2005 Amendments, which were filled by the end of 2005. Id. at 16.
290 See Patton Jr. et al., supra note 289, at 16 ("[P]ractitioners were becoming concerned about the
crowded dockets in Delaware and began to investigate alternative forums. Beginning with Enron's
bankruptcy, large and complex chapter 11Is started filing in other jurisdictions. Decisionmakers, including
Enron's legal team, were concerned that the very busy Delaware court could not give their clients the kind of
attention and responsiveness that such a complex case required."); see also Legislative Update: Testimony:
Court Competition for Large Ch. 11 Cases, 23 Am. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2004 at 6, 54 (2004) ("By 2000,
an unprecedented rise in the number of big case bankruptcy filings nationally had overwhelmed the
resources of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. The Delaware court had been awarded its second bankruptcy
judge on the basis of six big cases in 1992. In 2000, the Delaware court attracted 45 big cases. The effect of
the overload was to make Delaware a less-attractive venue. Most of the overflow went to New York.");
Miller, supra note 288, at 1996 (discussing risk that case would not receive "proper attention" due to
overwhelming number of cases pending in Delaware).
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4. The Specialization of the Article III Judiciary
A persistent concern with embracing specialized Article III courts has been the
fear that they dilute the prestige of sitting federal district and circuit judges. 291
Although this may be the case with respect to individual judges whose prestige is
premised on their position rather than their personal reputations for fairness and
quality of judgment, it is difficult to fathom how the many district and circuit judges
that I have known would be viewed as any less distinguished by the mere addition
of a specialized Article III bankruptcy court structure. Nor would carving out these
discrete matters from overburdened district courts suggest that those courts should
be held in any less esteem. Indeed, freedom from responsibility for these matters
may make district court appointments more desirable for the many practitioners and
other judicial candidates who are uncomfortable presiding over bankruptcy-related
matters.
As noted previously, another initial concern with Article III bankruptcy courts
was the degree to which future developments would render bankruptcy judges
unnecessary.2 However sincere these concerns may have been in 1978, we have
now crossed more than a century of uninterrupted federal bankruptcy law, including
three decades of the Code. The wholesale rescission of federal bankruptcy law is, at
best, highly unlikely given the extensive role of private and corporate credit and the
need for some sort of uniform nationwide bankruptcy system. During the last three
decades, bankruptcy filings have increased dramatically notwithstanding
amendments designed to make bankruptcy less beneficial to debtors. 293 And should
the need for bankruptcy judges defy this history and decline sharply, Congress
could reduce the number of authorized bankruptcy judges as sitting judges retire.
As also noted, a strong undercurrent in the objection to Article III status prior to
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code was their perception as less competent or
qualified than the generalist district and circuit judges of the time.294 Today, any
lingering conception of bankruptcy judges as somehow less qualified to address the
issues they will confront simply overlooks the reality concerning modem
bankruptcy judges and the pool of candidates from which they are selected. 295
291 Robert G. Skelton & Donald F. Harris, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction and Jury Trials: The Constitutional
Nightmare Continues, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 469, 515 (1991) (noting and refuting prestige argument against
Article III bankruptcy courts).
292 See supra Part I.B.
293 See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV.
1463, 1464, 1527 (Summer 2005) (noting flux in bankruptcy filings in past twenty-five years after enactment
of Bankruptcy Code in 1978).
294 See supra Part I.C.
295 See McKenzie, supra note 16, at 751 ("Bankruptcy may be a specialized process, with its own rhythms
that differ from litigation in other forums, but the substance of bankruptcy cases is not specialized.
Bankruptcy judges hear disputes from across the legal spectrum, confronting matters sounding in contract,
tort, property, labor, and almost every other area of civil law. It makes little sense to talk of 'specialized' or
'technical' bankruptcy adjudication when the matters decided by a typical bankruptcy judge are often
indistinguishable from the civil disputes on the docket of a federal district judge.").
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Given the expansive nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction under the 1984 Amendments
and the central role that bankruptcy plays in our society, it should come as no
surprise that modern bankruptcy practitioners are, in many respects, more akin to
the generalists of previous generations than most modern practitioners, especially
when contrasted with those holding the most coveted law firm and government
positions, which have become increasingly specialized in their own right.
Bankruptcy lawyers-particularly those representing debtors-must have a strong
working understanding of several areas of non-bankruptcy law in order to serve
their clients effectively, and they have the added benefit of knowing far more about
their clients' respective big picture practices and concerns than most pure litigators
and corporate lawyers because, once again, they must develop this understanding to
be effective.
That said, that fact that Article III bankruptcy courts would no longer be
confined by any constitutional limits on their judicial power could be detrimental to
the efficient administration of bankruptcy cases. Even as bankruptcy courts have
gradually assumed broader judicial authority over related matters, they have been
reluctant to press the boundaries of that authority too far as long as Marathon's
limits remained unsettled. One could easily envision a far more rapid expansion of
the bankruptcy courts' responsibility for non-bankruptcy matters that are, at best,
tangentially related to (or, at worst, wholly unrelated to) bankruptcy cases once
relieved of the limitations of Article I status. In short, the transformation of
bankruptcy courts into Article III courts for the purpose of improving their capacity
to hear all matters relevant to a bankruptcy case may appear to promote efficiency,
but these gains could be easily offset by their increased responsibility for matters
that are currently left to Article III judges.
Although the arguments have changed with the transformation of bankruptcy
law and practice, Article III status seems as unlikely and undesirable today as it was
four decades ago. Modem bankruptcy judges tend to be exceptionally qualified,
both in terms of understanding the law and addressing the complex array of
interests that appear before them. The dramatic shifts in the Article III
appointments process and growth of special interests that focus on bankruptcy
matters, however, suggests that opposition to Article III status will remain high and,
if adopted, will suffer from the same politicization that has weakened the Article III
judiciary generally. Although we may gain a more constitutionally sound
bankruptcy court structure in such a transition, this same appointments process
seems unlikely to produce a bankruptcy bench that matches the sophistication,
talent and capacity to handle the high volume of bankruptcy cases we see in Article
I bankruptcy courts today.
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B. Other Alternatives
1. Closing the Structural Gap Between Core and Constitutional Authority
Although some delays are intrinsic to the current system, others that may arise
following Marshall can be attributed to provisions in Title 28 and the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure clearly
assume that the bankruptcy court has constitutional authority to hear all core
matters, 296 but 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) provides a non-exclusive list of core matters 297
that appear unlikely to pass muster under Marshall and its predecessors. The
designation of all counterclaims (C), preferences (F), fraudulent conveyances (H),
and determinations of the validity, extent and priority of liens (K) as core captures a
wide range of matters that are inconsistent with the public/private dichotomy or
otherwise fails to account for the need for voluntary and knowing consent before
the bankruptcy court may enter a final order. This adds unnecessary confusion to
the process and may encourage litigation that can be avoided through modest
changes to Title 28, the Bankruptcy Rules, or both.
For example, given the focus of Bankruptcy Rules 7008 and 7012 on non-core
status as a precondition to the requirement that parties clearly express whether they
consent to adjudication,298 a party could simply plead that it agrees the matter is
core, therefore avoiding the obligation to expressly note whether the party consents
to bankruptcy court adjudication, and subsequently challenging the bankruptcy
court's authority to enter a final order. And where disputes do not require an
adversary proceeding, there is no comparable provision requiring a party to
expressly note its consent or lack thereof with respect to bankruptcy court
adjudication of private rights that are not clearly subject to any recognized
exception to Article III adjudication. 2 99
This concern may be addressed by either narrowing the matters that qualify as
core under 28 U.S.C. § 157 to better track the Court's precedent or requiring express
consent to adjudication of non-bankruptcy law rights in bankruptcy court. Although
some courts have adopted ad hoc pleading requirements that effectively serve this
purpose, 3 00 direct action to fill this gap by the Judicial Conference or Congress will
ensure the development of a consistent, uniform solution to the strategic pleading
problem.
296 Cf FED. R. BANKR. P. 9005.1 (stating that one may challenge constitutionality of any statute pursuant
to FED. R. Civ. P. 5.1, implying that statutes are assumed valid unless challenged via this rule).
297 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2006) (listing sixteen possible core proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in case under title 11).
298 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7008(a) (requiring as general rule of pleading in non-core proceeding statement
pleader does or does not consent to entry of final orders or judgment by bankruptcy judge); FED. R. BANKR.
P. 7012(b) (requiring in responsive pleading in non-core proceeding statement pleader does or does not
consent to entry of final orders or judgment by bankruptcy judge).
299FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001 (delineating which proceedings are adversary proceedings requiring party to
expressly note its consent or lack thereof with respect to bankruptcy court adjudication).
300 See supra section II.C.2.
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2. Closing the Temporal Constitutional Gap
As demonstrated, a convenient feature of the 1984 Amendments is the
flexibility it affords a district court to reframe an ostensibly final order issued by a
bankruptcy court as a report and recommendation. This feature helps explain why
so few of the questions about the margins of any public right exception in
bankruptcy have made their way beyond the federal district courts. Indeed, but for
the unique procedural posture and timing of events in Marshall, the public/private
question would have been largely resolved before the dispute reached the Ninth
Circuit for this very reason. 30 1
The problem with this administrative convenience is that we are only
marginally closer to having a workable framework for evaluating the
constitutionally permissible options in bankruptcy structure today than we were in
1982, and these questions appear more likely to be litigated in the lower courts after
Marshall. The ability to render these questions moot by shifting the form of the
review, however, works against the recognized need to promote consistency and
long-term efficiency of bankruptcy law by limiting the prospects for clear, binding
authority on these critical questions.30 2 The risk following Marshall is that de novo
review becomes too convenient a fallback where binding precedent does not
provide clear authority that such review is required, particularly where de novo
review may not entail more than a modest additional review of the record. 30 3
While de novo review may effectively render the private right question moot,
defaulting to this standard where bankruptcy court authority is unsettled
unnecessarily interferes with the design of the bankruptcy court structure. Like its
predecessors, Marshall is a limited holding premised upon rationale that are subject
to multiple competing interpretations. Scholars and practitioners could formulate
an endless array of tests for evaluating the constitutionality of bankruptcy court
authority over the other matters they may be assigned under bankruptcy law, but
developing a definitive test given modern precedent would be a bit like
extrapolating an entire puzzle from only a handful of pieces. Until the Court adopts
a unified theory of public right in bankruptcy, the sporadic application of these
theories in ways that effectively limit review on appeal may only add to the existing
confusion. Thus, interpreting Marshall narrowly is not only consistent with the
301 See supra section I.F.1.
302 See Brown, Non-Pecuniary Interests, supra note 272, at 587 ("[S]ubstantive appeals not only serve to
benefit the appellant; they play a vital role in preserving public confidence in the system, promoting
consistency among lower courts, and ensuring that non-bankruptcy law and interests are given proper
consideration.").
303 See In re Marshall, 271 B.R. 858, 865 (2001) (discussing the expeditious approach to de novo review
that prevails in bankruptcy).
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"presumption of constitutionality" 304 that attaches to the exercise of Congress'
power under Article I but also promotes long-term consistency in application.
To be clear, the use of de novo review of ostensibly final orders where required
need not-and should not-be abandoned, but it does caution against the overuse of
this option where the answer to the public/private distinction is unsettled. A pattern
of erring on the side of de novo review in response to Marshall and institutional
pressures to expedite resolution of individual disputes is contrary to the express
language of Stern and may create future inefficiencies by encouraging requests for
withdrawal of the reference or other challenges to bankruptcy adjudication. In sum,
district courts should continue to evaluate private right questions with a
presumption that bankruptcy courts have the power to enter final orders where
provided in the statute and not expressly prohibited by binding authority.
More aggressive judicial attention among the higher courts will have its
drawbacks. Courts tend to focus on the concerns that underlie specific cases rather
than the long-term stability of the law, and the piecemeal evolution of a private
rights framework may prove more confusing and unmanageable than one lacking
any clear guidance whatsoever. Bankruptcy experts may have an understandable
aversion to more active judicial review in this area, particularly given the perception
that the Supreme Court's recent bankruptcy opinions have been disruptive as a
matter of bankruptcy policy, misguided with respect to bankruptcy history or how
the bankruptcy system actually functions,3 05 and conceptually inconsistent.30 6 And,
this more active role could be particularly disruptive if matters that are central to
bankruptcy administration (for example, claim allowance and distribution) are
ultimately found to require Article III adjudication.
Without discounting these potential drawbacks, the perceived reach of Marshall
and the resulting concerns about the viability of the modern bankruptcy framework
provide some cause for optimism. The circuit courts are likely to have strong
judicial incentives to fashion clear guidelines in these early stages following
Marshall, and bankruptcy experts have equally strong incentives to be engaged in
the development of these guidelines. Indeed, early appeals in Marshall's wake
suggest that the higher courts are keenly aware of the threat to systemic efficiency
304 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 669 (2000) ("Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate
branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that
Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)
("Proper respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government requires the courts of the United States to give
effect to the presumption that Congress will pass no act not within its constitutional power. This presumption
should prevail unless the lack of constitutional authority to pass an act in question is clearly demonstrated.").
305 See, e.g., Plank, supra note 31 (challenging the Court's assertions concerning bankruptcy history); Eric
R. Sender, Comment, The Constitutionality of Section 106: A Historical Solution to a Modern Debate, 18
BANK. DEV. J. 131, 140 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's basic misunderstanding of bankruptcy court
practice with respect to state involvement in bankruptcy cases).
306 See, e.g., Lee Dembart & Bruce A. Markell, Alive at 25? A Short Review of the Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 1979-2004, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 394-95 (2004) (noting conceptual
inconsistencies in cases decided by the Court since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code).
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and stability and have engaged in careful consideration of the questions raised by
Marshall.
CONCLUSION
Marshall alters some facets of modern bankruptcy adjudication by, for the most
part, building only slightly upon longstanding precedent. Although it is fair to
characterize its holding as "narrow" standing alone, the collective lesson of
Marathon, Granfinanciera and Marshall is that the statutory allocation of
responsibility to bankruptcy courts requires them to exercise too much of the
judicial power of the United States without preserving in them the Article III
assurances of judicial independence.
Under the circumstances, the most obvious way to efficiently and fully advance
the efficiency objectives of the Bankruptcy Code is to adopt wholesale Article III
protections and status to Bankruptcy Courts, but this carries costs of its own.
Bankruptcy judges are arguably better qualified to resolve some of the matters that
must be passed along to district courts following Marshall, in large part due to the
dramatic transformation of bankruptcy practice made possible by the temporal
constitutional gap generated by the 1984 Amendments and lingering doubts about
the staying power of Marathon. Supplanting the merit-focused appointment
process for modern bankruptcy judges with politically driven Article III
appointments, however, would have an equally significant impact on the bankruptcy
system. The increasingly contentious Article III appointment process and the
degree to which special interests have controlled bankruptcy policy debates in
recent years suggest that Article III appointments will yield inefficiencies that
would overwhelm the perceived benefits of the shift. At the same time, it is far
from clear that the gradual expansion of matters adjudicated in bankruptcy court
prior to Marshall was a positive development for litigants or the efficient
administration of bankruptcy cases overall, though the common presumption is that
it was, and this expansion is certain to be far greater without the constraints of
Article I status.
Ultimately, the prospects for improving the long-term efficiency of the
bankruptcy process will hinge upon the development of clear guidelines concerning
the remaining public/private right questions and procedures that foreclose potential
gamesmanship by litigants. And though developing the answers to these questions
may yield further short-term instability and disruption, they should promote the
development of a better framework for bankruptcy administration that will avoid
much of the waste and delay that continue to keep the Bankruptcy Code from living
up to its potential.
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